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ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the impact of insider trading on options market
makers from the perspective of the characteristics of options as
complex securities, the structural features of options markets, and the
corresponding unique risks and hedges of these market participants.
It is argued that options market makers, as opposed to their
counterparts in equity markets, suffer unique substantial losses from
insider trading, and evidence to support this proposition is offered.
Judicial decisions on losses of options traders from insider trading
are reviewed and critiqued in order to develop several elements of a
methodology for calculating losses of options market makers. The
uniqueness of risks and hedges of options market makers is further
illustrated in the context of fraud-on-the-market.
INTRODUCTION
The practice of "insider trading," one form of "informed trading" in
securities markets with asymmetrically distributed information, is the
subject of fierce and protracted debate in fields such as securities
regulation, economics, corporate governance, politics and, ethics.' The
" J.D. (the University of Michigan), M.B.A. (the University of Chicago), B.S.B.A.
(Drake University), member of the North Carolina State Bar. The author thanks Henry
G. Manne for his guidance in life and Taja M. Beane, Christopher Borgmeyer, Matthew
Champagne, Christopher L. Culp, Barbara Garavaglia, Sarah A. Hall, Jeanne F. Long,
Khalil Nicholas Maalouf, J. Adam Martin, Kirk Oldford, Christal Phillips, Todd Rich,
Don Savemo, Ilya N. Shulman, Jeremy M. Suhr, and Sandra Zeff for their help and
expertise.
1. For surveys of various perspectives on the subject, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Insider Trading, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 772 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, in
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term "insider trading" typically encompasses transactions on company-
specific, material nonpublic information obtained through employment
status or special access to such information. This practice is probably as
old as the existence of securities markets.2 Insider trading is common in
today's sophisticated financial markets, given factors such as the avail-
ability of active and relatively anonymous trading venues, derivatives as
a means of leverage, and frequent announcements which generate large
price movements.3 While several empirical studies suggest that insider
trading regulation in the United States and abroad is somewhat effective,
other studies point at unintended consequences of such regulation and
even question its effectiveness and overall impact.4
THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 276 (David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed.
2007); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
MONEY & FINANCE 416 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992). The existing regulatory
framework does not extend to most forms of informed trading in commodities markets,
which probably should be classified as "outsider" rather than "insider" trading. See 6
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 15:62 (2d ed. 2007); Sharon Brown-
Hruska & Robert Zwirb, Legal Clarity and Regulatory Discretion-Exploring Law and
Economics of Insider Trading in Derivatives Markets, 2 CAPITAL MKTS. L.J. 245, 254-
55 (2007). An argument why taking advantage of informational asymmetry in markets
for corporate securities is more questionable than in commodities markets, suggesting
that corporate insiders are likely to manipulate stock prices via corporate disclosure to
increase their trading profits in contrast to the inherent dispersion of information in
commodities markets, was advanced as early as 1896. Henry Crosby Emery,
Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States, 7 STUD. HIST.
ECON. & PUB. L. 283, 460 (1896).
2. One of the earliest documented episodes of insider trading occurred in the
seventeenth-century England at the time of the emergence of joint-stock companies
with freely transferable shares. See I WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTr, THE CONSTITUTION AND
FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 344
(1912) (describing the allegations that "large shareholders used the knowledge they
obtained of the affairs of a certain company to make profits by speculation in the
shares").
3. For a recent commentary that addresses these factors and cites data suggesting
that insider trading is still common, see Brent Shearer, Forbidden Fruit, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, Oct. 2007, at 66. For a recent source suggesting that insider trading may
be on the rise, see Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is
There Adequate Criminal Enforcement?: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
4. For a brief survey of earlier empirical studies, see Stanislav Dolgopolov,
Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse Selection in
Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 147 n.302 (2004). Later-and revised-
empirical studies include Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work?, 11 EUR. FIN.
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Outsiders' losses caused by insider trading is the crucial issue in the
context of civil liability.5 Early insider trading cases typically addressed
face-to-face transactions which occurred in arguably deceptive
circumstances and inflicted losses on readily identifiable individuals
who were otherwise unlikely to consummate such transactions.6 Much
of the contemporary criticism relating to insider trading in organized
markets was directed at speculation by corporate directors and managers
because of the perceived inadequacy of disclosure and their incentives to
manipulate stock prices to create profitable trading opportunities.7
MGMT. 267 (2005); Art A. Durnev & Amrita S. Nain, Does Insider Trading Regulation
Deter Private Information Trading? International Evidence, 15 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 409
(2007); Nuno Fernandes & Miguel A. Ferreira, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Price
Informativeness, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1845 (2009); Aaron Gilbert et al., Insiders and the
Law: The Impact of Regulatory Change on Insider Trading, 47 MGMT. INT'L REV. 745
(2007); Thomas Lagoarde-Segot, Financial Reforms and Time-Varying Microstructures
in Emerging Equity Markets, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 1755 (2009); Abraham Ackerman et
al., Insider Trading Legislation and Acquisition Announcements: Do Laws Matter?
(Feb. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.
corn/abstract=868708; Bart Frijns et al., Elements of Effective Insider Trading Laws
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.fma.org/
Texas/Papers/ElementslnsiderTradingLaws.pdf; Joseph K. Tanimura, The Effects of
Insider Trading Restrictions: Evidence from Dividend Initiations and Omissions (1935-
1974) (Mar. 14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1359679; Jin Xu, New Evidence on the Effects of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract1 100641.
5. The regime of civil liability for insider trading, which was not explicitly spelled
out in the New Deal securities statutes, had started to develop in the 1940s and further
expanded in the 1960s. See David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 627 (1963). For an extensive analysis
of the current regime of civil liability for insider trading, see WILLIAM K.S. WANG &
MARK STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 6:1 to :14 (2d ed. 2005 & Rel. 1 2006).
6. For the early scholarship analyzing the contemporaneous case law on insider
trading, see Anson H. Bigalow, The Relation of Directors of a Corporation to
Individual Stockholders, 81 CENT. L.J. 256 (1915); N.C. Collier, Liabilities of Directors
and of Trustees to Beneficial Owners Compared, 74 CENT. L.J. 360 (1912); H.L.
Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 MICH.
L. REV. 267 (1910).
7. See DANIEL RAYMOND, THE ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY 276 (Baltimore, Cushing & Brother, 4th ed. 1840); WILLIAM Z.
RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 208-16 (1915); Steve Thel, The
Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 391, 428-34, 474-89 (1991); Form Letter from Brayton Ives, Salem T.
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Furthermore, the intertwined issues of loss causation and estimation of
damages are more problematic in organized markets.8 From a static
perspective, insider trading in organized markets is still a zero-sum
game which redistributes wealth from outsiders to insiders, 9 but it is
difficult to identify "losers" in both actual and preempted transactions,
let alone calculate such losses.10 Several publications in the 1960s and
Russell & Donald MacKay, N.Y. Stock Exch., to listed companies (Oct. 11, 1875) (on
file with author). At least some large companies chose self-regulation to limit potential
insider trading. See WILLIAM Z. RiPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 206 (1927);
Directors' Ethics and Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1928, at 3. On the other
hand, insider trading was rationalized as an appropriate reward for otherwise nominally
compensated directors actively involved in company affairs. See Should Directors
Speculate?, 6 ANNALIST: MAG. FIN. COM. & ECON. 65, 65 (1915).
8. The leading precedent until the 1960s, Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659
(Mass. 1933), refused to impose liability for insider trading in organized markets by
stating that transactions "on the stock exchange are commonly impersonal affairs," id.
at 362, arguing that an insider's disclosure of relevant information to the counterparty in
such circumstances would be impracticable, id., and asserting that "an equality as to
knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness" is impossible, id. at 363. For a rejection
of the Goodwin approach in the administrative adjudication of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") that laid the foundation for insider trading regulation,
see Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 n.25 (1961).
9. For the presentation of this concept, known as the "Law of the Conservation of
Securities," see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, § 3:3.5. See also Henry G. Manne,
In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113, 114-15
(arguing that insider trading induces unfavorable transactions by short-term traders-
not necessarily those who trade directly with insiders); Barry A. Goodman, Comment,
Insider Trading Without Disclosure-Theory of Liability, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 472, 477
(1967) (arguing that, with insider trading, "some investor would be substituted for the
insider and the injury would be shifted to this investor").
10. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, § 3:3.7. For the earliest academic works
that pointed to the difficulty with identifying parties directly harmed by insider trading,
see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET passim (1966); Jack
M. Whitney II, Section 10b-5: From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of
Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAW. 193, 200-04 (1965); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REv. 1023, 1047 (1990)
(arguing that "measurable harm to individual investors from routine instances of insider
trading is difficult to discern (or at most, terribly diffuse)"). The identification of
persons harmed by insider trading has remained a problem, leading to the adoption of
the controversial "contemporaneous trader" proxy. See Veronica M. Dougherty, A
[Dis]semblance of Privity: Criticizing the Contemporaneous Trader Requirement in
Insider Trading, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83 (1999). In addition to the difficulty of
identifying market participants who traded and were injured because of insider trading,
preempted market participants do not have standing under Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
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1970s pointed to market makers1" as a group directly harmed by insider
trading.12 This theoretical argument seemed to be quite insignificant in
practice, and equity market makers themselves did not appear to be
concerned about insider trading as such. 13  Yet, in later years, this
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
11. Market makers-also known as "liquidity providers"-such as "specialists" on
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), "dealers" on NASDAQ, or "market makers"
on the Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE"), create a continuous two-sided
market by posting "bid" and "ask" quotes, matching incoming orders, and providing
their own capital to absorb immediate order imbalances. For the statutory definition of
the term "market maker," see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(38) (2006). For general sources on
market makers, see ALLEN JAN BAIRD, OPTION MARKET MAKING: TRADING AND RISK
ANALYSIS FOR THE FINANCIAL AND COMMODITY OPTION MARKETS (1993); LARRY
HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS
chs. 13, 24 (2003); MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY (Yakov Amihud et al. eds., 1985). From the standpoint of
aggregate economic welfare, it is argued that "[t]he market maker in general adds to the
stability, liquidity and transparency (i.e. price discovery mechanism) of financial
markets." EMERGING MKTS. COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, THE INFLUENCE OF
MARKET MAKERS IN THE CREATION OF LIQUIDITY 2 (1999), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD94.pdf. See also JOHN FIELD, JUN.,
FORTUNE'S EPITOME OF STOCKS & PUBLIC FUNDS 8 (London, Sherwood, Gilbert &
Piper, 14th ed. 1838) (arguing that "[t]he accommodation ... afforded [by market
makers] to the public is of the highest value").
12. See Walter Bagehot (pseudo. for Jack L. Treynor), The Only Game in Town,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 12 (arguing that insider trading unfavorably
affects inventories of market makers, forces them to increase bid-ask spreads, and thus
decreases the market's liquidity); Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and
Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1299 n.130 (1965) (pointing to the problem "when
the insider deals with . . . a specialist or ... a market maker"); D. Jeanne Patterson,
Book Review, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 971, 973 (1967) (reviewing MANNE, supra note 10)
(arguing that insider trading harms "specialists ... providing a continuous market in the
shares of a corporation").
13. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4 (analyzing evidence pertaining to losses of
market makers from insider trading, finding very little evidence that such losses are
significant for equity market makers, and identifying evidence of losses of options
market makers). Interestingly, in one of the earliest insider trading cases, Tucker v.
Barker, (1881) 16 L.J.R. 66, 1881 W. N. 120 (Ch. D.), which involved a claim against a
director who had purchased several preferred shares based on inside information about
a likely sale of the company, the plaintiff was probably a market marker because he was
identified as a "stockjobber" in a secondary source. HENRY HURRELL & CLARENDON G.
HYDE, THE LAW OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES: THEIR
POWERS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 93 (4th ed. 1905). For further factual details, which
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argument gained force. Frequent reports of substantial losses of options
market makers' 4 from insider trading 5 coincided with the emergence of
exchange-traded standardized equity options. 16
suggest a face-to-face transaction in an illiquid market negotiated over a period of time,
and excerpts from this unpublished opinion, a copy of which survives in neither the
court records nor the National Archives of the United Kingdom, see id. at 93-94. The
court, in a decision anomalous for its time, concluded that "an agent or a director of a
company trafficking in the shares of the company cannot be allowed to make a profit
unless the fullest explanation is given, and the utmost truth is told, and every fact
necessary for the formation of a judgment... is presented." Id. at 94.
14. Options market makers post bid and ask prices for "plain vanilla" options, such
as calls and puts, and certain combinations of "plain vanilla" options, such as straddles,
strangles, butterflies, and time spreads. See SHELDON NATENBERG, OPTION VOLATILITY
& PRICING: ADVANCED TRADING STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 170 (rev. ed. 1994).
There are various types of options market makers, which could be called "market
makers," "specialists," "scalpers," or "book runners," with some options exchanges
having "a crowd of marketmakers who trade on their own accounts [while others]
employ a specialist system, with additional marketmaking provided by registered
options traders who trade on the floor for their own accounts." Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 764-65 (5th ed. 2004). A
specialist system is distinguished by the existence of a designated market maker
enjoying certain exchange-granted privileges, such as an exclusive right to execute limit
orders or a guaranteed portion of the order flow, and there is some empirical evidence
that this arrangement may lower transaction costs in options markets. See Amber Anand
& Daniel G. Weaver, The Value of the Specialist: Empirical Evidence from the CBOE,
9 J. FIN. MKTS. 100 (2006). For additional sources on options market makers, see
BAIRD, supra note 11; ROBERT L. MCDONALD, DERIVATIVES MARKETS ch. 13 (2d ed.
2006); NASSIM TALEB, DYNAMIC HEDGING: MANAGING VANILLA AND EXOTIC OPTIONS
ch. 3 (1997); MICHAEL S. WILLIAMS & AMY HOFFMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE
OPTIONS MARKET ch. 10 (2001); William L. Silber, Marketmaking in Options:
Principles and Implications, in FINANCIAL OPTIONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 485
(Stephen Figlewski et al. eds., 1990); Yusif E. Semaan & Luiren Wu, Price Discovery
in the U.S. Stock Options Market, J. DERIVATIVES, Winter 2007, at 20.
15. See infra Section II.
16. The existence of options market makers is not a recent phenomenon. For
instance, specialized intermediaries regularly posting bid and ask quotes for equity
options existed on the London Stock Exchange ("LSE") over a century ago. See
CHARLES DUGUID, THE STOCK EXCHANGE 72 (1904); WALTER S. SCHWABE & G.A.H.
BRANSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 56-57 (1905). On the
other hand, such intermediaries probably had not emerged at the same time as options
markets themselves. Although relatively active markets in equity options with a degree
of standardization in options contracts and perhaps some specialization in transacting in
such financial instruments had existed in Amsterdam and London by the end of the
seventeenth century, these trading venues did not seem to have dealers providing truly
continuous markets as opposed to mere active traders in options. See JOSEPH DE LA
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The U.S. Congress codified the private right of action "in con-
nection with a purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option, privilege"
in 1984,17 and, prior to this legislation, several courts had already
established liability for trading options on inside information. 8 Courts
also often recognized the economic utility of options markets instead of
labeling these derivatives as purely speculative. 19 This existing case
VEGA, CONFUSION DE CONFUsIONEs 7-9, 24, 31-32 (Hermann Kellenbenz ed. & trans.,
Harvard Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin. 1957) (1688); Anne L. Murphy, Trading
Options Before Black-Scholes: A Study of the Market in the Late-Seventeenth-Century
London, 62 EcON. HIST. REV. (S1 ISSUE) 8 (2009).
17. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 5, 98 Stat. 1264,
1265 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (2006)). For a discussion of how this legislation
clarified the regulatory framework, see Steve Thel, Closing a Loophole: Insider
Trading in Standardized Options, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (1988); William K.S.
Wang, A Cause of Action for Option Traders Against Insider Option Traders, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1988).
18. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
modified, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (imposing liability on insiders for
purchasing options in the open market while in possession of information about a rich
ore deposit's discovery); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (giving standing to sue insiders for purchasing options in
the open market while in possession of information about an upcoming tender offer).
The Supreme Court also observed the following:
[T]he holders of puts, calls, options, and other contractual rights or duties to purchase
or sell securities have been recognized as "purchasers" or "sellers" of securities for
purposes of Rule 1 Ob-5, not because of a judicial conclusion that they were similarly
situated to "purchasers" or "sellers" but because the definitional provisions of the
1934 Act themselves grant them such a status.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 (1975).
19. See, e.g., Fry v. UAL Corp., 84 F.3d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
options contribute to "maintaining the efficiency of the securities markets");
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988) (arguing that options
permit market participants "to engage in hedging transactions, which are . . . risk
reducing"); Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771, 776 (D. Mass. 1988)
(citing empirical studies to suggest that options "may decrease the price-volatility of the
underlying securities . . . [and] increase trading volume of the underlying security,
thereby increasing stock liquidity"); see also Elizabeth M. Sacksteder, Note, Securities
Regulation for a Changing Market: Option Trader Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 97
YALE L.J. 623, 632 (1987) (arguing that the existence of options "enhances the depth
and liquidity of the stock market, maximizing stock prices and lowering the
corporation's cost of capital") (footnotes omitted); Stewart Mayhew, The Impact of
Derivatives on Cash Markets: What Have We Learned?, at i (Feb. 3, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://media.terry.
uga.edu/documents/fmance/impact.pdf (presenting a comprehensive summary of
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law, however, yields no comprehensive analysis of the unique nature of
losses of options market makers, given their trading strategies and risk
exposures. The same doctrinal void exists with respect to losses of
options traders more generally.
This Article analyzes the impact of insider trading on options
market makers and argues that these market participants, as opposed to
their counterparts in equity markets, suffer unique substantial losses
from this practice. Section I maintains that the nature of options ex-
plains the uniqueness of losses of options market makers. Section II
contends that losses of options market makers are evident from the
frequent occurrence of insider trading in options markets, as suggested
by numerous empirical studies, the position taken by the options
industry, numerous relevant lawsuits, and other evidence. Section III
reviews and critiques the existing judicial decisions with respect to
calculations of losses of options traders from insider trading and
develops several elements of a methodology for calculating losses of
options market makers. Section IV explores the boundaries of the fraud-
on-the-market doctrine and asserts that this context, also stemming from
informational asymmetry, further illustrates the uniqueness of risks and
hedges of options market makers. This Article concludes by analyzing
the importance of the cost that insider trading imposes on options market
makers and arguing for the recognition of their unique risks and hedges
in civil litigation.
I. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE UNIQUENESS OF LOSSES OF OPTIONS MARKET
MAKERS FROM INSIDER TRADING
This Section maintains that the nature of options explains the
uniqueness of losses of options market makers. Part A describes the
alleged harm to market makers from insider trading in the context of
equity markets and argues that the magnitude of this harm is negligible.
Part B maintains that the characteristics of options as complex securities,
the structural features of options markets, and the process of providing
liquidity in these financial instruments expose options market makers to
unique losses compared to their counterparts in equity markets.
theoretical and empirical studies on the impact of derivatives, including options, on
markets in underlying assets and concluding that "[t]he empirical evidence suggests that
the introduction of derivatives does not destabilize the underlying market [and] tends to
improve the liquidity and informativeness of markets").
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A. Alleged Harm to Market Makers in the Context of Equit Markets
The belief that insider trading directly damages all market makers
and imposes a cost on securities markets in the form of higher bid-ask
spreads has influenced academics and regulators.20 In many markets,
any insider always trades directly with a market maker--or at least
preempts him from making a favorable trade-because the latter, as a
marginal trader, absorbs with his capital all immediate order imbalances,
and this argument appears to demonstrate the existence of actual losses
inflicted on market makers.2'
The claim that market makers incur substantial harm appears
largely illusory in the context of equity markets both before and after the
emergence of insider trading regulation.22 In fact, some researchers
were puzzled why the failure to reach an equilibrium bid-ask spread
appropriately compensating a market maker in the presence of informed
trading does not occur "[i]n real-world markets., 23 The argument that
market makers are always marginal traders damaged by insiders'
transactions ignores that a typical equity market maker manages his
inventory, i.e., a buffer absorbing order imbalances, to adjust his risk
exposure. This practice suggests that insider trading does not necessarily
have an adverse impact on this inventory when the relevant piece of
information is absorbed by the market.2 4 Historically, equity market
20. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 92-107.
21. See BERNHARD BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIABILITY IN THE U.S.A. AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 128 (1991) (arguing that "specialists and market makers
committed to trade the other side of unmatched transactions... are the only ones who
are really 'caused' to trade [with insiders] even in the absence of inducing price
effects").
22. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, passim.
23. Hans R. Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in MARKET MAKING AND
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, supra note 11, at 67, 78.
24. Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 110-14. The existence of inventory management
via adjustments of bid and ask prices by "jobbers," i.e., market makers, on the LSE was
noted a long time ago: "[W]hen [jobbers] find that their books are to a large extent 'all
one way' they ... quote[] prices which prevent their being either saddled with large
lumps of stock which they have little chance of disposing of... or... of being made
'bears' against their will." Money-Market and City Intelligence, TIMES (London), July
16, 1884, at 11. See also HENRY KEYSER, THE LAW RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS ON
THE STOCK EXCHANGE 27 (London, Henry Butterworth 1850) ("The mere jobber
generally tries to make his account even, to buy as much as he sells, or sell as much as
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makers-including NYSE specialists-have not expressed any special
concern about insider trading.25 One significant exception relates to
block transactions by "block dealers"/"upstairs dealers"/"upstairs market
makers," as it is common knowledge that many of these market
participants try to identify and avoid information-based orders.26
Empirical studies attempting to prove that insider trading-along
with informed trading more generally-increases bid-ask spreads in
equity markets, 27 including numerous bid-ask spread decomposition
studies aiming to quantify the "adverse selection" component,28 seem to
have confused informed trading with price volatility, 29 and other
empirical research has further compromised the validity of this
hypothesis. 30 Attempts to validate the link between informed trading and
liquidity by showing a correlation between the adverse selection
component and an estimate of the "probability of informed trading"
variable3" are also problematic for methodological reasons.
In addition to a wide variation of estimates of the "adverse
selection" component, this component also captures forms of informed
he buys .... ").
25. Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 108-10.
26. For an empirical analysis of this phenomenon, see Brian F. Smith et al.,
Upstairs Market for Principal and Agency Trades: Analysis ofAdverse Information and
Price Effects, 56 J. FIN. 1723 (2001). For a discussion of inventory management-related
problems associated with block trades, see Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 113-14.
27. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, passim.
28. For a summary of empirical bid-ask spread decomposition studies and their
respective estimates of the adverse selection component, see id. at 150-62. For a sample
of recent studies, see Timotheos Angelidis & Alexandros Benos, The Components of
the Bid-Ask Spread: the Case of the Athens Stock Exchange, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 112
(2009); Charlie X. Cai et al., Trading Frictions and Market Structure: An Empirical
Analysis, 35 J. Bus. FIN. & ACcT. 563 (2008); Kee H. Chung et al., Specialists, Limit-
Order Traders, and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 39 FIN. REV. 255 (2004);
Brian Prucyk, Specialist Risk Attitudes and the Bid-Ask Spread, 40 FIN. REV. 223
(2005); Baljit Sidhu et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse
Selection, 46 J. ACCT. REs. 697 (2008).
29. Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 130-33, 172-74. The fact that volatility increases
the relevant bid-ask spread, then called the "jobber's turn" or the "turn of the market,"
was described as early as 1875. See ARTHUR CRUMP, THE THEORY OF STOCK EXCHANGE
SPECULATION 124-26 (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 4th ed. 1875).
30. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 162, 171-74.
31. See Kee H. Chung & Mingsheng Li, Adverse-Selection Costs and the
Probability ofInformation-Based Trading, 38 FIN. REV. 257 (2003); Joachim Grammig
et al., Knowing Me, Knowing You: Trader Anonymity and Informed Trading in Parallel
Markets, 4 J. FIN. MKTS. 385 (2001).
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trading other than insider trading. Indeed, market makers in both equity
and options markets are likely to be harmed by trading on short-lived
information stemming from non-instantaneous dissemination of public
announcements, advance knowledge of certain trading trends or
incoming orders, or certain advantages in acquiring, processing, and
aggregating public information.32 The nature of trading on such short-
lived information makes it much harder for a market maker to rebalance
his inventory, and this harm might be compounded by the staleness of
bid and ask quotes: "Even though the market maker's price is valid for
only a few seconds, market makers can thus be expected to being
'picked off' when information comes out during that time and the
market maker cannot officially change his quotes. 3 3 Similarly, taken as
a whole, existing case studies of unregulated and weakly regulated
securities markets do not lend strong support to the view that insider
trading harms equity market makers and increases bid-ask spreads. 34
32. Perhaps the impact of this type of trading is captured in empirical studies that
link informed trading and liquidity via such factors as anonymity of transactions and
reputation of intermediaries or propose an information-based explanation for the
practice of price improvements offered by market makers to selected traders. See Robert
Battalio et al., Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 62 J.
FIN. 1243 (2007); Kaun Y. Lee & Kee H. Chung, Information-Based Trading and Price
Improvement, 36 J. Bus. FIN. & ACcT. 754 (2009); Erik Theissen, Trader Anonymity,
Price Formation and Liquidity, 7 EuR. FIN. REv. 1 (2003); Andrew C. Waisburd,
Anonymity and Liquidity: Evidence from the Paris Bourse (Jan. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
33. TALEB, supra note 14, at 61. For instance, one category of equity market
makers, NASDAQ dealers, had expressed concerns about the costs imposed by
"bandits" operating on the Small Order Execution System ("SOES"), but these "SOES
bandits" were short-term parasitic traders who exploited inflexible quotes but did not
have any fundamental "inside" information. Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 109 n. 119.
See also Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 455-56, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing
potential harm from SOES trading to NASDAQ dealers that might increase bid-ask
spreads); George J. Benston & Robert A. Wood, Why Effective Spreads on NASDAQ
Were Higher Than on the New York Stock Exchange in the 1990s, 15 J. EMPLRJCAL FIN.
17 (2008) (presenting an empirical link between SOES trading and bid-ask spreads on
NASDAQ). A similar trading platform on the CBOE, the Retail Automated Execution
System ("RAES"), resulted in complaints of CBOE market makers about losses
inflicted by "RAES bandits." See Erin Arvedlund, Options Arbitrage for the Masses,
THESTREET.COM, Jan. 22, 2000, http://www.thestreet.com/story/866958/1/options-
arbitrage-for-the-masses.html; Mark Longo, Time-Price Priority Gains: Customer
Priority in Options Marts Comes Under Pressure, TRADERS MAG., Feb. 2007, at 1.
34. One study analyzed the Berlin Stock Exchange in the late nineteenth and early
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Furthermore, empirical studies that capture the correlation between
greater informational advantages enjoyed by certain equity market
makers and greater liquidity35 do not necessarily reflect the informed
trading effect.
36
twentieth centuries and concluded that, in this very active-and unregulated-securities
market, "trading costs were low.., in the decades before World War I, even by modem
US standards and certainly by recent German standards." Thomas Gehrig & Caroline
Fohlin, Trading Costs in Early Securities Markets: The Case of the Berlin Stock
Exchange 1880-1910, 10 REV. FIN. 587, 589-90 (2006). Puzzled by this result, the
study hypothesized that "the Berlin banks may have intervened in price determination
as informed market makers and thereby reduced adverse selection costs." Id. at 610. By
contrast, a related study of the NYSE argued that the adverse selection component of
bid-ask spreads for a representative sample of common stocks increased from 49% in
1900 to 69% in 1910. Caroline Fohlin et al., Liquidity and Competition in Unregulated
Markets: The New York Stock Exchange Before the SEC 44 tbl.4 (Feb. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract--1341629. This result is surprising because of the lack of evidence that NYSE
specialists were concerned about insider trading. The obtained results also displayed
several inconsistencies when broken down by subgroups. See id. at 22-23, 44 tbl.4.
Furthermore, the study's bid-ask spread decomposition methodology ignored the
existence of the inventory holding component, which probably distorted the results. See
Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 173 n.502. Another study examined the modem Prague
Stock Exchange, a weakly regulated market where insider trading is common, and
concluded that the adverse selection component averages at 17%, a surprisingly low-
and even lower-estimate compared to similar empirical studies analyzing more strictly
regulated securities markets in the United States. Jan Hanousek & Richard Podpiera,
Informed Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence from an Emerging Market, 31 J.
COMP. EcON. 275, 295 (2003). On the other hand, a study of the weakly regulated
Mexican Stock Exchange concluded that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask
spread averages at 95%. Ana Cristina Silva & Gonzalo Chavez, Components of
Execution Costs: Evidence of Asymmetric Information at the Mexican Stock Exchange,
12 J. INT'L FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 253, 265 (2002). Inconsistent results
produced by these studies probably reflect the unreliability of existing bid-ask spread
decomposition methodologies. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 149-62, 172-74.
35. See Shantaram P. Hegde & Robert E. Miller, Market-Making in Initial Public
Offerings of Common Stocks: An Empirical Analysis, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 75 (1989) (discussing underwriting activities); Leonardo Madureira & Shane
Underwood, Information, Sell-Side Research, and Market Making, 90 J. FIN. EcON. 105
(2008) (discussing specialization in securities research); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider
Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms, 4 J.L. ECON. &
POL'Y 369 (2008) (discussing board representation).
36. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 128 n.220.
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B. Significance of the Characteristics of Options as Complex Securities,
the Structural Features of Options Markets, and the Process of
Providing Liquidity in Options
Losses of options market makers are different from losses of equity
market makers because of the differences between these two types of
financial instruments. 37 A typical option is a complex security with a
payoff linked to a future characteristic of the relevant underlying
security and a predetermined expiration date, and it is usually created
by a party other than the issuer of the underlying security. Options are
also more volatile and hence riskier than their underlying securities
because of an inherently higher leverage: "Options are highly leveraged
instruments [whose values] characteristically shrink or explode at
rapidly changing and sometimes greater rates than the underlying
instrument."3 8  Non-linearity of options is not just a mathematical
concept; it is engrained in the minds of professional traders: "Options
are multidimensional and nonlinear. . . . That's what makes options
what they are, and that's what makes the options business different from
other businesses. 39
Options market makers have to take positions in a variety of options
on the same underlying security rather than simply match incoming
trades in the same asset, as equity market makers do. As one
commentator observed,
[Options] market makers must use their own capital to complete
anywhere from 40% to 100% of trades in the options in which they
make markets. That's because buyers and sellers of options can pick
and choose between dozens of options positions on the same stock
with a variety of strike prices and expiration dates, making it
37. While the leading treatises on the subject argue that insider trading harms
market makers, they offer credible evidence of harm pertaining only to options market
makers. 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT
AND PREVENTION § 1.3 (2009); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, § 3:3.6.
38. BAIRD, supra note 11, at 6. The standard approach to estimating option values
is the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model. Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The
Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Robert C.
Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 141 (1973).
39. MARTIN P. O'CONNELL, THE BUSINESS OF OPTIONS: TIME-TESTED PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICES 7 (2001).
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practically impossible to match each transaction .... 40
Likewise, one options market maker noted that
[t]he multitude of strikes and calendar series ... may easily push the
distinct options traded into hundreds for each underlying instrument,
many of which may not trade on a regular basis. While an
underlying-asset market maker is always a scalper on a short-term
basis, this observation is not necessarily true of options market
makers.... Option market makers assume a large carryover risk that
other financial dealers may not, and this longer-term assumption of
risk may affect dealer price. 41
40. Suzanne McGee, Where Have the Inside Traders Gone? Options Markets Are
Their New Home, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, at C20.
41. BAIRD, supra note 11, at 5. This observation is confirmed by empirical studies
suggesting that equity market makers can rebalance their inventories relatively quickly.
Similar studies of futures markets come to the same conclusion, which is consistent
with the fact that futures contracts with the same expiration date have only one price as
opposed to options on the same stock with the same expiration date but different
exercise prices. For such studies of equity and futures markets, see Alex Frino et al.,
Life in the Pits: Competitive Market Making and Inventory Management-Further
Australian Evidence, 9 J. MULTrNAT'L FIN. MGMT. 373 (1999) (evidence from the
Sydney Futures Exchange); Joel Hasbrouck & George Sofianos, The Trades of Market
Makers: An Empirical Analysis of NYSE Specialists, 48 J. FIN. 1565 (1993) (evidence
from the NYSE); Gregory J. Kuserk & Peter R. Locke, Scalper Behavior in Futures
Markets: An Empirical Examination, 13 J. FUTURES MKTS. 409 (1993) (evidence from
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange); Steven Manaster & Steven C. Mann, Life in the
Pits: Competitive Market Making and Inventory Control, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 953 (1996)
(same); William L. Silber, Marketmaker Behavior in an Auction Market: An Analysis of
Scalpers in Futures Markets, 39 J. FN. 937 (1984) (evidence from the New York
Futures Exchange); Andy Snell & Ian Tonks, Determinants of Quote Price Revisions on
the London Stock Exchange, 105 EcON. J. 77 (1995) (evidence from the LSE); Yiuman
Tse, Market Microstructure of FT-SE 100 Index Futures: An Intraday Empirical
Analysis, 19 J. FUTURES MKTS. 31 (1999) (evidence from the London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange); Marios Panayides, The Specialist's
Participation in Quoted Prices and the NYSE Continuity Rule (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin.,
Working Paper 04-05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=492423 (evidence
from the NYSE). However, affirmative obligations imposed on certain market makers,
such as NYSE specialists, can interfere with the process of inventory management. See
Marios A. Panayides, Affirmative Obligations and Market Making with Inventory, 86 J.
FIN. ECON. 513 (2007). The only empirical study known to the author suggesting that
options market makers are able to "end the trading day with very low levels of
inventory in order to mitigate their exposure to overnight inventory holding risk"
analyzed commodity rather than equity options. Naomi Boyd, Market Makers in
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Another options market maker made a similar remark: "I can count
on one hand the number of times the option gods smiled upon me in
such a way as to allow me to immediately scalp an option .... Market
makers joke that very low-volume options trade 'by appointment
only.' ' 42  Similarly, two industry professionals observed that "[t]wo-
sided order flow is generally more common in larger issues that have
greater volume .... [F]or most options market makers, however, two-
sided order flow is rare. '43 As a consequence, an options market maker
"may end up owning or shorting contracts that he or she must be
prepared to hold for long periods of time (even to expiration) unless he
or she wishes to liquidate to other market makers, thus giving up the
edge. 44 On the other hand, despite the illiquidity of individual options,
the inventory holding risk of options market makers may be somewhat
mitigated:
Although order flow for any particular strike price and expiration
date might very well be sparse, the order flow for all options on a
particular underlying asset is much larger. Because options are
derivative assets, all options on the same underlying asset are very
close substitutes for each other. Marketmakers take advantage of this
relationship to reduce their inventory risk. 
45
Overall, options market makers have problems with managing their
inventories because they deal in a variety of relatively illiquid options
offered on the same equity instrument.46 Inventory management also
has an influence on certain characteristics of such options, 47 and, as one
Options Markets: An Investigation of the NYMEX Natural Gas Market 36 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.fma.org/
Texas/Papers/MarketMaking__in-OptionsMarketsFMA.pdf.
42. DAN PASSARELLI, TRADING OPTION GREEKS: How TIME, VOLATILITY, AND
OTHER PRICING FACTORS DRIvE PROFIT 317 (2008).
43. WILLIAMS & HOFFMAN, supra note 14, at 58.
44. BARD, supra note 11, at 5.
45. Silber, supra note 14, at 490. See also id. at 496 (arguing that "the principle of
synthetic puts and calls allows the marketmaker to quote bid and offer prices for options
that have little or no order flow").
46. See McGee, supra note 40. Furthermore, "[t]he heterogeneity of options
compounds [market makers'] costs because it forces [them] to monitor the prices and
inventories of several related yet different options on a stock." Anand M. Vijh,
Liquidity of the CBOE Equity Options, 45 J. FIN. 1157, 1171 (1990).
47. The existence of the so-called "volatility smile"--also known as the "volatility
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industry professional remarked, "[tlhere is no doubt that from a market
maker's point of view, an option's fair value depends on his current
,,41position.
Unlike their counterparts in equity markets, options market makers
in many instances do not simultaneously buy and sell the same security
and profit from the bid-ask spread alone. Instead, they "write" options,
in exchange for a premium, and bear the risk of their future exercise,49
as secondary trading of options is often thin.5° As a CBOE options
skew"-the puzzling phenomenon of different implied volatilities for options on the
same underlying asset with different strike prices but the same expiration date, is at least
partially explained by options market makers' inventory management, which is
influenced by supply and demand trends for options with different strike prices. See
CHARLES M. COTTLE, OPTIONS: PERCEPTION AND DECEPTION: POSITION DISSECTION,
RISK ANALYSIS, AND DEFENSIVE TRADING STRATEGIES 298 (1996); M.S. JOSHI, THE
CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE OF MATHEMATICAL FINANCE 73 (2003); NATENBERG, supra
note 14, at 414; DENNIS YANG, QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIES FOR DERIVATIVES TRADING
3-4 (2006); Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Robert E. Whaley, Does Net Buying Pressure Affect
the Shape of Implied Volatility Functions, 59 J. FIN. 711 (2004); Len Yates, Exploiting
Volatility for Maximum Gains, in DAVID L. KAPLAN, THE NEW OPTION SECRET:
VOLATILITY 251, 261 (1996). But there are other possible-and, sometimes,
interacting-forces contributing to the volatility smile's existence. See FRANS DE
WEERT, AN INTRODUCTION TO OPTIONS TRADING 103 (2006) (the combination of the
fact that volatility is price direction-dependent and the necessity of more frequent re-
hedging of an option position with a lower strike price when the price of the underlying
asset moves away from a higher strike price); Bruno Dupire, A Unified Theory of
Volatility, in DERIVATIVES PRICING: THE CLASSIC COLLECTION 185, 187 (Peter Carr ed.,
2004) (jumps in the underlying asset's price); Steve Hotopp, Practical Issues
Concerning Volatility and Its Measurement, Past and Predicted, in VOLATILITY IN THE
CAPITAL MARKETS: STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNIQUES FOR MODELING, MANAGING, AND
TRADING VOLATILITY 1, 2-3 (Israel Nelken ed., 1997) (the non-normality of the
underlying asset's returns); Hersh Shefrin, Irrational Exuberance and Option Smiles,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 91 (heterogeneous beliefs of market participants);
Klaus Bjerre Toft & Brian Prucyk, Options on Leveraged Equity: Theory and Empirical
Tests, 52 J. FIN. 1151 (1997) (the relevant company's financial leverage); Interview
with a former CBOE options market maker "A" in Chicago, Ill. (June 30 & July 10,
2009) [hereinafter "A" Interview] (price limits and minimum price increments).
48. YANG, supra note 47, at 4. See also WILLIAMS & HOFFMAN, supra note 14, at
237 ("[W]hen a market maker determines whether he or she will pay (or sell) one price
over another, he or she determines not only the theoretical value of the option but also
whether or not the option is a specific fit for risk-management purposes.").
49. See Dan Colarusso, Tales from the Pits: Trapped by Insider Trading,
THESTREET.COM, June 4, 1998, http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/optionsbuzz/
15765.html.
50. BAIRD, supra note 11, at 5.
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market maker noted, "we are usually not selling from 'inventory'.
Rather, we are creating the options to sell to the buyer." 51 Focusing on
bid-ask spreads as the source of profits from buying and selling the same
asset obscures the reality that options market makers often create
different leveraged securities and profit from options premiums-not
just bid-ask spreads arising from nearly simultaneous roundtrip
52transactions.
More generally, because of the heterogeneity of their portfolios, the
characteristics of derivatives positions, and the complexity of their
trading strategies, options market makers resort to sophisticated
techniques to manage their risks. These techniques typically involve the
use of underlying securities and related derivatives, such as options and
futures.53 In the process, monitoring various risk metrics, such as the
"Greeks,"54 becomes critical for providing liquidity in options markets.
51. Colarusso, supra note 49. Drawing on the same concept, one empirical study
maintained that options' bid and ask prices are asymmetrically distributed around such
options' true values and provided the following explanation: "Since the loss is limited
for buying an option but unlimited for selling ...the adverse-selection cost [of an
options market maker] is larger for buy orders than sell orders ...." Kalok Chan & Y.
Peter Chung, Asymmetric Price Distribution and Bid-Ask Quotes in the Stock Options
Market 3 (Feb. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://home.ust.hk/-kachan/research/spread.pdf.
52. Even the leading primer on derivatives describes options market makers as
entities that "make their profits from the bid-ask spread." JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS,
FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 189 (7th ed. 2008). A federal district court
similarly argued that a CBOE market maker "derives his profit from the 'spread'-that
is, the difference between the bid and asked price." Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 181
F.R.D. 398, 411 (D. Minn. 1998).
53. See BAIRD, supra note 11, chs. 5-8.
54. The Greeks are popular risk metrics that essentially capture the price sensitivity
of an option to the parameters of the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model and
their derivatives, such as "delta" as the "[s]ensitivity of the option price to the change in
the underlying asset price," "gamma" as the "[s]ensitivity of the option delta to the
change in the underlying asset price," "vega," also known as "kappa," as the
"[s]ensitivity of the option price to the change in implied volatility," "theta" as the
"[e]xpected change in the option price with the passage of time assuming risk-neutral
growth in the asset," and "rho" as the "[s]ensitivity of the option price to interest rates
or dividend payout." TALEB, supra note 14, at 10. For short definitions of these Greeks
and less frequently used risk metrics, their shortcomings, and useful modifications, see
id. at 112-13. For a more detailed analysis of these risk metrics, see id. chs. 7-11.
55. See BAIRD, supra note 11, chs. 5-8 (an options market maker stressing the
importance of managing risk exposure to various Greeks); Mel Jameson & William
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Accordingly, "the derived nature of options means the dimension of risk
management is broadened to the control of the sensitivity of the option
portfolio value to various Greek variables rather than a single target
inventory level. 56 As pointed out by an options market maker, option
positions that are neutral with respect to several Greek variables "are
actually employed, or at least attempted, by traders such as market
makers who try to make their profits from the difference between the bid
and offer of an options quote, and not from assuming market risk."' 7
Another options market maker remarked that "the real skill of market
making comes in maintaining the appropriate delta-neutral limited-risk
option carryover positions. Without a risk-defined strategy the market
maker will risk losing not only the liquidity function profit but also his
or her entire capital."5 8 Indeed, managing Greeks is pivotal for profit-
ability: "Derivatives market making in both standard and nonstandard
products is an attractive occupation because although every option is
relatively illiquid, the market as a whole for the Greeks is very liquid...
. The compensation for traders comes from offsetting the Greek risks
Wilhelm, Market Making in the Options Markets and the Costs of Discrete Hedge
Rebalancing, 47 J. FIN. 765 (1992) (an empirical study arguing that bid-ask spreads in
options markets are partly determined by gamma and vega); David Michayluk et al.,
Decomposing the Bid-Ask Spread of Stock Options: A Trade and Risk Indicator Model
(Sept. 4, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/banking/seminar/2006/Yip.pdf (an empirical study
arguing that bid-ask spreads in options markets are partly determined by delta, gamma,
and vega).
56. Michayluk et al., supra note 55, at 12.
57. LAWRENCE G. MCMILLAN, OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT 881 (4th ed.
2002). See also In re Motel 6 Sec. Litig., 161 F. Supp. 2d 227, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(discussing the delta-neutral hedging strategy of the plaintiff options market makers);
JOHN C. Cox & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 308 (1985) (arguing that "many
Market Makers attempt to adhere quite strictly to a delta-neutral strategy"). For an early
observation suggesting that options market makers prefer to avoid position-taking, see
LEONARD R. HIGGINS, THE PUT-AND-CALL 38-39, 55 (1902). On the other hand, an
industry professional noted that the increasing competition and tightening bid-ask
spreads are forcing options market makers to engage in proprietary trading, i.e.,
position-taking, in addition to providing liquidity. "A" Interview, supra note 47.
However, as noted by another industry professional, "speculative or directional
strategies require the expenditure of time and effort in developing a technical or
fundamental forecasting model of some sort, whereas market making is already a full-
time trading activity." BAIRD, supra note 11, at 119.
58. BAIRD, supra note 11, at 152-53.
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(delta, vega, gamma) more rapidly than predicted."'5 9
To immunize themselves from price fluctuations and to guarantee a
profit by creating an opposite synthetic position at a lower cost--or to
remove at least some degree of risk-options market makers could
engage in "static replication"/"static hedging." This approach refers to
replicating the payoffs of an option position with other financial
instruments to create "a match . . . that does not require continuous
rebalancing. 6 °  For instance, options market makers use available
options on the same underlying security to create a near-perfect static
hedge based on the put-call parity relationship 61 or to enter into
insurance-like positions to protect themselves from extreme price
62
movements. But static replication is often problematic because the
components of the required hedge either do not exist or are traded in
illiquid markets with high transaction costs, because the asset to be
replicated, such as an option, can be highly nonlinear, which makes it
problematic to construct a hedge consisting of more liquid assets with
linear payoffs, or because parameters influencing the value of the asset
to be replicated may change.63
59. TALEB, supra note 14, at 53.
60. Id. at 256. See also id. at 257 ("The best static hedge is the one that matches
the Greeks on every state across all the nodes.").
61. See MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 433; see also BAIRD, supra note 11, ch. 5.
As an industry professional remarked, "[h]edging options with . . . a synthetically
identical option by using the put-cal-parity removes all the risk all the time-it not only
hedges your delta, but also your gamma, vega and theta, etc ..... It is a robust hedge
against jumps in the asset price and what is known as stochastic volatility." ESPEN
GAARDER HAUG, Option Pricing and Hedging from Theory to Practice: Know Your
Weapon I1, in DERIVATIVES: MODELS ON MODELS 33, 56 (2007).
62. See MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 433.
63. SALiH N. NEFTCI, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 177 (2d ed. 2008);
TALEB, supra note 14, at 256-57. In the case of equity options, the market for the
underlying security is typically liquid, but covering written calls or puts by simply
buying or shorting an equivalent number of shares, i.e., linear instruments, serves as a
good static hedge only if such options are subsequently exercised. An options market
maker would still be exposed to potentially large risks ex ante, and buying or shorting a
large number of shares by itself could be problematic for a number of reasons.
However, static replication can be practical in such cases as hedging complex "exotic"
options by using "plain vanilla" options, as replicating portfolios would consist of
nonlinear instruments. See Peter Carr et al., Static Hedging of Exotic Options, 53 J. FIN.
1165 (1998); Emmanuel Derman et al., Static Options Replication, J. DERIVATIVES,
Summer 1995, at 78; Morten Nalholm & Rolf Poulsen, Static Hedging and Model Risk
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Another approach employed by options market makers is "dynamic
replication"/"dynamic hedging," a strategy of "sticking to a minimum
Greek exposure and rebalancing continuously to achieve a certain
neutrality" for a given position. 64 In the context of dynamic hedging, an
option position is "neutral" with respect to a Greek for a small change in
the variable in question, but a large change, as well as changes in other
variables, including the passage of time, could make this position non-
neutral. 65 Another factor is that there are some economies of scale in
dynamic hedging, which helps manage transaction CoStS. 66
A simple dynamic hedging strategy, however, such as delta hedging
with the underlying security, cannot completely immunize options
market makers. As summarized by an industry professional, "[e]very
knowledgeable market maker or option trader knows very well that [he]
cannot remove all risk or even most of the risk by dynamic delta
replication. 67 One solution is to neutralize a given position by engaging
in dynamic hedging with respect to several Greeks: despite potential
changes caused by market conditions, "the profitability of an option
position or portfolio will be much more stable when it is neutral with
respect to several of these measures of exposure. 68
Dynamic hedging with respect to gamma and vega is common, 69 as
this approach protects options market makers from large price jumps and
for Barrier Options, 26 J. FuTuREs MKTS. 449 (2006).
64. TALEB, supra note 14, at 258. The concept of dynamic hedging of an option by
combining positions in the underlying asset and the risk-free asset is at the heart of the
Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model. See Black & Scholes, supra note 38;
Merton, supra note 38. Dynamic hedging has been known for a long time; for instance,
the following observation about options trading in the United Kingdom was made a
century ago: "It is usual for the person who is to receive the option money [i.e., the
premium] to minimize his risk by selling or buying half the stock which he has
eventually to accept or deliver, and later on he will judge by the market position
whether it will suit him to sell or buy the rest of the stock before the option is declared."
WYNDHAM A. BEWES, STOCK EXCHANGE LAW AND PRACTICE 48 (1910).
65. See LAWRENCE G. MCMILLAN, MCMILLAN ON OPTIONS 448, 491, 495 (2d ed.
2004).
66. HULL, supra note 52, at 376.
67. HAUG, supra note 61, at 56.
68. MCMILLAN, supra note 65, at 455.
69. HULL, supra note 52, at 377. According to one industry professional, hedging
gamma and vega is critical for profitable options market making. Interview with a
former CBOE options market maker "B" in Chicago, I11. (July 14 & 21, 2009)
[hereinafter "B" Interview].
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changing volatility 7 and creates more stable hedges that need to be
rebalanced less frequently compared to delta-neutral hedges.71 On the
other hand, dynamic hedging of gamma and theta necessitates the use of
nonlinear instruments, such as options on the same underlying
security,72 and hedging both of these Greeks usually requires at least two
traded options. 73  The nature of dynamic hedging also highlights
difficulties with making markets in options as nonlinear derivatives
compared to futures as linear derivatives because typically the latter
have more stable hedge positions and require only delta hedging.74
Because rebalancing cannot be instantaneous and costless, dynamic
hedging still leaves the risk of the market moving against options market
makers.75 In practice, options market makers "do not hedge every
option dynamically; instead they hedge only their extremely small net
,,76position. Furthermore, the viability of both static and dynamic
70. HULL, supra note 52, at 375.
71. Id. at 377; "A" Interview, supra note 47; "B" Interview, supra note 69. In
practice, "[g]amma and vega are monitored, but are not usually managed on a daily
basis." HULL, supra note 52, at 377.
72. HULL, supra note 52, at 376. See also BAIRD, supra note 11, at 154 ("The basis
of all successful risk hedging is both delta and kappa/vega hedging. Since the only way
to hedge an option's kappa/vega is with another option, all effective risk hedging must
involve option spread trading."); TALEB, supra note 14, at 260 ("Trading options
against options proves to be a safe way to hedge against the host of second, third
derivatives, and so on [such as gamma and vega] that plague the trader."). Another
industry professional also emphasized the importance of hedging options with options
in addition to delta hedging: "[M]arket makers often hedge residual risk with delta
hedging, but they tend to try truncating their tail risk [with options] .... Going long or
truncating your wing risk does not necessarily mean you get an edge with expected
profit, it is just a way to ... insure you from blowing up." HAUG, supra note 61, at 62.
73. HULL, supra note 52, at 373.
74. See TALEB, supra note 14, at 126; see also HULL, supra note 52, at 379.
75. See Emanuel Derman & Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Illusions of Dynamic
Replication, 5 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 323, 323-25 (2005) (pointing out that dynamic
replication is constrained by discontinuous price movements of the underlying asset,
transaction costs, and liquidity constrains); Jameson & Wilhelm, supra note 55, at 778
(arguing, on the basis of empirical evidence, that "the inability to costlessly and
continuously rebalance an option portfolio imposes undiversifiable risks on market
participants [such as options market makers]").
76. Derman & Taleb, supra note 75, at 323. See also MCMILLAN, supra note 57, at
167 ("Delta-neutral hedging is . . . even difficult for market-makers, who pay no
commissions."); TALEB, supra note 14, at 53 ("The inherent instability of derivative
position and their dependence on time and market levels makes it clearly impossible to
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hedging with related options on the same underlying security is
problematic because "it is difficult to find options or other nonlinear
derivatives that can be traded in the volume required at competitive
prices."77  In the end, options market makers still have to assume
substantial order flow-related risks: "Most [options] market makers like
to trade flat-that is, profit from the bid-ask spread and strive to lower
exposure to direction, time, volatility, and interest as much as possible.
But market makers are at the mercy of customer orders, or paper, as it's
known in the industry.,
78
Risk exposures of options market makers are unique because they
trade multiple options with different expiration dates and strike prices,
which are less liquid and more leveraged than underlying securities, face
limitations of dynamic and static hedging of options as nonlinear
derivatives, and assume additional risk by creating options instead of
trading from their inventories. Overall, "much of the skill of option
market making comes from being able to manage [position-related] risks
well in a large carryover position until expiration," 9 and inventory
management is more complex than it is for equity market makers.80
Consequently, the adverse impact of a trade with a better-informed
define oneself as completely 'flat,' except when the book is empty of trades, a rare
occurrence."); Colarusso, supra note 49 ("To the extent that positions may go
unhedged, [options market makers are] going to have dynamic risk."); Antoine
Giannetti et al., Inventory Hedging and Option Market Making, 7 INT'L J. THEORETICAL
& APPLIED FIN. 853, 874 (2004) ("[In the context of the presented model of dynamic
hedging,] option market making risk is essentially a hedging risk.").
77. HULL, supra note 52, at 376. In practice, options market makers also use
options on highly correlated assets, which may mitigate this problem to some degree.
"A" Interview, supra note 47.
78. PASSARELLI, supra note 42, at 317. See also David Bukey, Yahuda Belsky: A
Market Maker's Perspective, FUTURES & OPTIONS TRADER, June 2007, at 34, 35
("Market makers sold calls they thought were overpriced, but they couldn't create a
spread (i.e., buy higher-strike calls) or buy stock as a hedge at a decent price. Acting as
a market marker in a one-sided environment isn't always fun and games.").
79. BAIRD, supra note 11, at 6-7.
80. As one empirical study concluded, options market makers "face risks in
managing inventory that are unique to the options markets." Jameson & Wilhelm, supra
note 55, at 765 (emphasis added). The fact that market making in options is more
problematic than in equity instruments was pointed out as early as 1910 in the context
of securities markets in the United Kingdom: "The business of [an equity market
maker] consists almost entirely in covering his business as he goes along .... With
Options, however, it is practically impossible to 'undo' the business thoroughly ......
LAWRENCE R. DICKSEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 128-29 (1910).
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insider on an options market maker's inventory is potentially large
because of difficulties with rebalancing positions rapidly. The fact that
options market makers create leveraged securities also stacks the odds
against them: "Option writers who trade with insiders are perhaps the
most clearly and seriously harmed of all, because of the leverage that
works for the insiders and against the writers.' Overall, this analysis
suggests that options market makers are vulnerable to insider trading.
II. EVIDENCE OF LOSSES OF OPTIONS MARKET MAKERS
FROM INSIDER TRADING
This Section contends that losses of options market makers are
evident from the frequent occurrence of insider trading in options
markets, as suggested by numerous empirical studies, the position taken
by the options industry, numerous relevant lawsuits, and other evidence.
Part A examines empirical studies and other evidence on the occurrence
of informed trading in options and provides an explanation for this
phenomenon. Part B reviews empirical bid-ask spread decomposition
studies that analyze options markets and concludes that such studies are
inconclusive and contradictory. Part C argues that the position adopted
by the options industry and the existence of case law in this area
demonstrate the cost of insider trading to options market makers and
possible implications for the liquidity of options markets.
A. Empirical Evidence on the Occurrence of Informed Trading in
Options Markets and the Reasons for Its Existence
Numerous empirical studies have suggested that informed trading
in options, with illegal insider trading probably constituting a significant
portion of such transactions, is quite common and that, under certain
conditions, informed traders may prefer to trade in options instead of
stocks to capitalize on their information,8 2 although this conclusion is
81. 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, § 6:116.
82. See Kaushik I. Amin & Charles M.C. Lee, Option Trading, Price Discovery,
and Earnings News Dissemination, 14 CONTEMP. ACCT. REs. 153 (1997); Tom Arnold
et al., Do Option Markets Substitute for Stock Markets? Evidence from Trading on
Anticipated Tender Offer Announcements, 15 INT'L REv. FIN. ANALYSIS 247 (2006);
Timothy Cairney & Judith Swisher, The Role of the Options Market in the
Dissemination of Private Information, 37 J. BUs. FIN. & ACCT. 1015 (2004); Charles
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contested by several empirical studies.83 A related group of studies has
suggested the existence of informed trading in credit default swaps, i.e.,
complex over-the-counter derivatives with optionality features,
8 4
Cao et al., Informational Content of Option Volume Prior to Takeovers, 78 J. Bus. 1073
(2005); Sugato Chakravarty et al., Informed Trading in Stock and Option Markets, 59 J.
FIN. 1235 (2004); Kam C. Chan et al., Informed Trading Under Different Market
Conditions and Moneyness: Evidence from TXO Options, 17 PAC.-BAsN FIN. J. 189
(2009); Carl R. Chen et al., Information Flows Between the Stock and Option Markets:
Where Do Informed Traders Trade?, 14 REV. FIN. ECON. 1 (2005); David Easley et al.,
Option Volume and Stock Prices: Evidence on Where Informed Traders Trade, 53 J.
FIN. 431 (1998); Narayanan Jayaraman et al., Informed Trading Around Merger
Announcements: An Empirical Test Using Transaction Volume and Open Interest in
Options Markets, 37 FIN. REV. 45 (2001); Jason Lee & Cheong H. Yi, Trade Size and
Information-Motivated Trading in the Options and Stock Markets, 36 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 485 (2001); Haim Levy & James A. Yoder, The Behavior of
Option Implied Standard Deviations Around Merger and Acquisition Announcements,
28 FIN. REV. 261 (1993); Dan C. McGuire & Ronald J. Kudla, Option Prices as an
Indicator of Stock Return Expectations, 18 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 421 (1991); Jun Pan &
Allen M. Poteshman, The Information in Option Volume for Future Stock Prices, 19
REV. FIN. STUD. 871 (2006); Aamir M. Sheikh & Ehud I. Ronn, A Characterization of
Daily and Intraday Behavior of Returns on Options, 49 J. FIN. 557 (1994); Joshua
Turkington & David Walsh, Informed Traders and Their Market Preference: Empirical
Evidence from Prices and Volumes of Options and Stock, 8 PAC.-BAsN FIN. J. 559
(2000); Natividad Blasco et al., Does Informed Trading Occur in the Options Market?
Some Revealing Clues (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-id=905204; Xuewu Wesley Wang, Informed
Option Trading Around Merger Announcements (July 12, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.
com/abstractid= 159206.
83. See Kalok Chan et al., The Informational Role of Stock and Option Volume, 15
REV. FIN. STUD. 1049, 1051-52 (2002) (suggesting that "informed investors initiate
trades [via market orders] in the stock market only"); Siu Kai Choy & Jason Wei,
Option Trading: Information or Differences of Opinion? 29 (Apr. 23, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract_id=1395205 (arguing that "informed trading is not detected in options").
84. See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit
Derivatives, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 110 (2007); Antje Berndt & Anastasiya Ostrovnaya, Do
Equity Markets Favor Credit Market News Over Options Market News? (Aug. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.andrew.
cmu.edu/user/abemdt/BeOs08.pdf, Charles Cao et al., The Information Content of
Option-Implied Volatility for Credit Default Swap Valuation (Sept. 9, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/
abstractid=889867. One of these studies specifically addressed the issue of liquidity
and found no evidence that "the degree of asymmetric information adversely affects
prices or liquidity in either the equity or credit markets." Acharya & Johnson, supra, at
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although these is no clear lead-lag relation relative to exchange-traded
standardized equity options.85 Several studies also have attempted to
identify types of options preferred by informed traders. 8 6 Furthermore,
there is evidence that, in some instances, insider trading dominates
options markets. 8' The explanation for these observations is that options
110.
85. See Berndt & Ostrovnaya, supra note 84; Cao et al., supra note 84.
86. Conventional wisdom suggests that informed trades are more likely to be made
in near-maturity/out-of-the-money-i.e., low time premium/high-leverage--options and
empirical studies generally support this view. See Amber Anand & Sugato Chakravarty,
Stealth Trading in Options Markets, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 167, 186
(2007) (preference for at-the-money options); Cao et al., supra note 82, at 1097
(preference for near-maturity/out-of-money options); Chakravarty et al., supra note 82,
at 1238 (preference for out-of-money options); Chan et al., supra note 82, at 207
(preference for out-of-money options); Chen et al., supra note 82, at 16 (preference for
out-of-money options); Jayaraman et al., supra note 82, at 64, 68 (preference for near-
maturity/out-of-the-money options); Blasco, supra note 82, at 11, 13, 15 (preference for
out-of-money options); Gautam Kaul et al., Informed Trading and Options Spreads 16
(Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=547462 (preference for at-the-money and slightly out-of-
money options); Michayluk et al., supra note 55, at 21 (preference for out-of-money
options); Wang, supra note 82, at 4 (preference for near-maturity and at-the-money
options). This lack of unanimity may be rationalized on the grounds that informed
traders are likely to trade strategically, balancing between such factors as leverage,
transaction costs, and liquidity as a proxy for the ability to disguise informed trading.
See Amin & Lee, supra note 82, at 182; Kaul et al., supra, at 16. Characteristics of
certain option transactions that are more likely to be informed often suggest the
presence of insider trading. For instance, an empirical study pointed out that, "[p]rior to
[takeover/merger] announcements, buying activity is highest in the short-term out-of-
the-money call options (with the highest leverage). It suggests that those making the
trades are relatively certain that an announcement will occur and occur soon." Cao et
al., supra note 82, at 1075.
87. See, e.g., SEC v. One or More Purchasers of Call Options for the Common
Stock of CNS, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-4540 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2006), Litigation
Release No. 19, 867, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2328, at *2 (Oct. 13, 2006) (pointing out that
alleged insider trading "represented approximately 67% to 100% of the daily volume of
the various CNS options series on the days purchased"); Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Seeks
Buyers of Duracell Options with Inside Knowledge of Gillette Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept.
17, 1996, at A2 (stating that alleged insider trading "represented 100% of the daily
trading activity in one speculative options contract and 35% of the volume in another");
Jeffrey Taylor & Stephen E. Frank, Inside Track: Takeovers Spur Rash of Trading
Investigations, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1994, at Cl (discussing suspicious trading before
an acquisition announcement and stating that "[w]hile trading in Gerber's [the acquired
412 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LA W
markets provide more financial leverage, lower implicit interest rates,
and more opportunities to circumvent short-selling restrictions common
in equity markets.88 Trading in options also allows one to profit on
information about future volatility, which is nearly impossible to do in
equity markets without knowing "how the stock price will respond" in
terms of its direction.89 Indeed, "[b]y their very operation, the options
markets provide a forum ideally suited to insider trading." 90 Further-
more, given limitations of equity markets for realizing the value of a
piece of information, "many potential information traders will trade on
the options markets when they wouldn't bother to trade at all if the
options market did not exist."9' As a result, market makers "will face a
more dangerous trading environment on an options exchange [as
company] stock rose more than 40% over its average in that period, trading volume in
some Gerber call options soared more than 3,000%").
88. See Raman Kumar et al., The Impact of Options Trading on the Market Quality
of the Underlying Security: An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 717, 718-19 (1998).
89. COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 55. For another discussion of the
importance of volatility information trading, see Sophie X. Ni et al., Volatility
Information Trading in the Option Market, 63 J. FIN. 1059 (2008). Volatility is a key-
although not directly observable---determinant of options prices, and the relationship
between the underlying security's volatility-including changes in volatility based on
the market's perception of uncertainties facing the company in question-and the price
of an option seems to have been understood at the dawn of equity options trading. See
Murphy, supra note 16, at 22-24. Volatility is an extremely important factor for options
market makers. As one unnamed CBOE market maker remarked, "[w]e don't trade
stocks; we trade volatility." O'CoNNELL, supra note 39, at 81. Furthermore, an options
market maker's bid and ask prices are often quoted in terms of their implied volatilities.
KAPLAN, supra note 47, at 101. See also PASSARELLI, supra note 42, at 58 ("When
immediate directional risk is eliminated from a position, TV [implied volatility]
becomes the traded commodity.").
90. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Insider Trading in Non-Equity
Securities, 49 Bus. LAW. 187, 196 (1993). See also SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596,
619-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[The] opportunities [to profit from inside information about a
tender offer] can be greatly maximized on the options market because the value of an
option contract tends to increase by a much greater percentage than the value of the
underlying stock."); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH
CONG., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 183 (Comm. Print 1979) ("The leverage offered by
options, which permits substantial percentage gains on a small capital investment, and
the existence of a liquid market for options have created new opportunities for
profitable options trading based in non-public market information.").
91. Fischer Black, Fact and Fantasy in the Use of Options, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-
Aug. 1975, at 36, 61.
2010 RISKS AND HEDGES OF PROVIDING 413
LIQUIDITY IN COMPLEX SECURITIES
compared] to a stock exchange. 92 On the other hand, given their own
constraints, options markets do not always displace equity markets as
the preferred venue for informed trading: "It may be easier to detect
illegal insider trading in the options market, as many contracts are thinly
traded. Options are also generally associated with higher proportional
transaction costs and less liquidity." 93
B. Empirical Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition Studies in the
Context of Options Markets
Several empirical bid-ask spread decomposition studies analyzed
the impact of informed trading on options markets. In one of the earliest
studies, Anand M. Vijh estimated the adverse selection component of
bid-ask spreads for a sample of CBOE options at less than 1%94 and
concluded that "information effects in option trades are very small and
do not have a substantial influence on option liquidity."95 A study by
Jason Lee and Cheong H. Yi calculated the adverse selection component
92. Id. Compared to equity markets, options markets tend to have higher per-
centage spreads, i.e., bid-ask spreads expressed as percentages of applicable assets'
prices. See PASSARELLI, supra note 42, at 63. However, greater losses of options
market makers attributed to informed trading are not the only force behind this
phenomenon, as various hedging and inventory-management considerations specific to
options also play a role. One explanation is the financial leverage inherent in options.
Id. Similarly, less liquid options markets should have higher percentage spreads than
more liquid markets for underlying securities. See LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS, 1878, C.
2157-1, para. 2699, at 98 (testimony of Robert Burt Marzetti, LSE market maker) ("In a
stock where there is very little dealing the quotation is always wider, a man must have a
wider margin to cover his risk .... "); Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82
Q.J. ECON. 33, 41 (1968) ("The fundamental force working to reduce the spread is the
time rate of transactions."). Furthermore, in the context of dynamic hedging, "the
percentage spreads in the production costs of derivative securities can be many times
larger than the spreads in their underlying securities." ROBERT C. MERTON,
CONTINUOus-TIME FINANCE 440 (rev. ed. 1992).
93. Cao et al., supra note 82, at 1077. Not surprisingly, empirical studies analyzing
the lead-lag relation between equity and options markets with respect to price discovery
have produced mixed results. For surveys of such studies, see Anand & Chakravarty,
supra note 86, at 169-70; Cao et al., supra note 82, at 1074; Easley et al., supra note 82,
at 432.
94. Vijh, supra note 46, at 1177.
95. Id. at 1159.
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for a similar sample of CBOE options to be 38%96 and criticized Vijh's
results because he focused on larger options trades that are more visible
and hence less likely to be informed. 97 However, Vijh used large
options trades just to measure their price impact, 98 and trades of all sizes
were employed to calculate the adverse selection component.
99
Another CBOE-centered study by David J. Hait estimated the
adverse selection component at less than 2%,100 although it concluded
that "our simple model of asymmetric information is too simple, and
does not adequately capture the pricing of asymmetric information
within the spread."' 0 ' This study also observed that "models of asym-
metric information for the options markets are necessarily more
complex"' 1 2 because there are different types of information, including
volatility information, that could be exploited in options markets,
because noise traders can trade in both stock and options markets, and
because informed trading can occur in a variety of options on the same
equity instrument.0 3 In fact, another study of the CBOE by Joseph A.
Cherian and Anne Fremault Vila distinguished among "volatility traders
... with information about future volatility" and "directional traders...
with information about future price movements in the underlying
security" and came to a surprising conclusion that "the presence of
volatility traders tends to widen the bid-ask spread in options but the
presence of directional traders has the opposite effect."'0 4 Another study
analyzing the CBOE by Gautam Kaul, M. Nimalendran, and Donghang
Zhang concluded that "option market makers do face significant adverse
selection costs because informed agents trade on the options market
96. Lee & Yi, supra note 82, at 496 tbl.4.
97. Id. at 487.
98. Vijh, supra note 46, at 1160.
99. Id. at 1171-72.
100. David J. Hait, Essays on Options Markets 66 (May 1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, New York University) (on file with author).
101. Id. at 65-66.
102. Id. at 51.
103. Id. at 51-52.
104. JOSEPH A. CHERIAN & ANNE FREMAULT VILA, INFORMATION TRADING,
VOLATILITY, AND LIQuIDITY IN OPTION MARKETS 1 (1997). On the other hand, a
subsequent extension of this methodology involving "volatility" and "directional"
traders, which was also based on the CBOE data, did not unambiguously confirm the
prior results. See Joseph A. Cherian & William Y. Weng, An Empirical Analysis of
Directional and Volatility Trading in Options Markets, J. DERIVATIVES, Winter 1999, at
53.
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[and]... are not able to completely hedge the risk arising from trading
with informed agents."' 5 More specifically, the study estimated the
adverse selection component for at-the-money/slightly out-of-the-money
and out-of-money options at 34% and 10%, respectively.10 6 Another
study by Min-Hsien Chiang and Yun Lin compared the NYSE and
CBOE and concluded that the adverse selection components for these
two trading venues are 83% and 67% or 75%, depending on the daily
measure used, respectively.'07
Several studies turned their attention to trading venues other than
the CBOE. David Michayluk, Laurie Prather, Li-Anne E. Woo, and
Henry Y.K. Yip analyzed bid-ask spreads of options traded on the
Australian Stock Exchange and estimated the adverse selection
component at 5%. 108 Another study by S6hnke M. Bartram, Frank Fehle,
and David G. Shrider compared options traded on Eurex, a leading
European derivatives exchange, and similar bank-issued warrants traded
on the Stuttgart Stock Exchange. 09 Because the latter venue is non-
anonymous and has greater hedging costs compared to the former, the
authors concluded that "more than half of the bid-ask spreads on the
traditional EuRex exchange represent the adverse selection component
of the spread."110
Several studies even assumed away the adverse selection
component of bid-ask spreads in their respective modeling approaches.
For instance, in his study of options traded on the Austrian Stock
Exchange, Felix Landsiedl maintained that "[m]arket makers are
assumed to hedge all risk exposures arising from option transactions,
[and] option bid-ask spreads depend on order processing and delta
105. Kaul et al., supra note 86, at 3.
106. Id. This model incorporated the initial hedging cost and the rebalancing cost to
reflect the specifics of providing liquidity in options, id. at 5-6, but it did not include the
inventory holding cost, making an argument, which is not entirely convincing, that
"option market makers rarely take directional risks; even if they carry inventory, it is
likely to be hedged," id. at 7 n.5.
107. Min-Hsien Chiang & Yun Lin, Investigating Bid-Ask Spread Components
Between the NYSE and the CBOE, 1 ADvANCES QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS FIN. & ACCT.
(n.s.) 85, 99 (2004).
108. Michayluk et al., supra note 55, at 29.
109. S6hnke M. Bartram et al., Does Adverse Selection Affect Bid-Ask Spreads for
Options?, 28 J. FUTURES MKTS. 417 (2008).
110. Id. at 436.
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hedging costs, inventory holding costs and competition.""' Giovanni
Petrella also made a similar assumption in his study of covered warrants,
which are option-like instruments, traded on the Italian Stock Exchange:
"[A] representative market maker does not fear to trade with informed
traders, because his position is hedged against variations in the
underlying asset price by holding delta neutral portfolios, but he does
fear to trade with scalpers [i.e., short-term traders exploiting temporary
price patterns and inflexible quotes]." ' 2 Giovanni Petrella and Reuben
Segara used the same approach in a study analyzing covered warrants
traded on the Australian Stock Exchange. 113 The assumption of near-
perfect hedging with respect to the underlying asset's price, however,
might not be a useful approximation of the reality of options market
making.
Given the inconclusive and contradictory results of these empirical
bid-ask spread decomposition studies, it appears that there is no
consensus with respect to quantifying the impact of informed trading on
transaction costs in options markets as a proxy for options market
makers' losses. 14 This state of the research probably is explained by
111. Felix Landsiedl, The Market Microstructure of Illiquid Option Markets and
Interrelations with the Underlying Market 24 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;
jsessionid=4B7A518AB6BAA721EDA7301680742CE5?doi= 10.1.1.89.2321 &rep=rep
l&type=pdf. This approach, called the "derivative hedge theory," was first developed
in Young-Hye Cho & Robert F. Engle, Modeling the Impacts of Market Activity on Bid-
Ask Spreads in the Option Market (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7331, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7331.pdf The original
contribution stated that "[i]n a perfect hedge world, spreads arise from the illiquidity of
the underlying market, rather than from inventory risk or informed trading in the option
market itself' but also recognized that "the illiquidity in the underlying asset leads to an
imperfect hedge in the option markets and as a result, the option market activity itself
still may have an effect on the spreads of options." Id. at 29.
112. Giovanni Petrella, Option Bid-Ask Spread and Scalping Risk. Evidence from a
Covered Warrants Market, 26 J. FUTuRES MKTS. 843, 865 (2006).
113. Giovanni Petrella & Reuben Segara, Determinants of Liquidity for Bank-Issued
Options: Evidence from the Australian Covered Warrants Market (Aug. 25, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
=1253168.
114. Several related studies of bid-ask spreads in options markets employed
regressions based on readily observable variables with the bid-ask spread as the
endogenous variable and treated such variables as volatility, trading volume, and delta
as imperfect proxies for informed trading, but it is problematic to estimate the liquidity
cost of informed trading based on these studies. See Sean Pinder, An Empirical
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methodological problems, and numerous empirical bid-ask spread
decomposition studies in the context of equity markets also raise similar
concerns."
5
C. Position Adopted by the Options Industry and the Relevant Case Law
Perhaps the most important piece of evidence is that options market
makers and exchanges have repeatedly expressed their concerns about
insider trading. "6 As one commentator vividly put it, "the brutality of
trading on insider information has severe ramifications in several places,
and one place in particular: the options pits. Options market makers feel
they can quickly become chalk outlines on the trading pit steps.""17 As
one prominent options trader remarked,
I have nothing to gain by making a tight market because if I price the
option right, [the insider will] pass-that is, he won't do anything-
and if I price it wrong, he'll trade, and I'll lose . . . If you're a
market maker . . . you live in fear thatlou're going to be the one
selling the option to an informed source.
The risk of trading with an insider was also described by another options
market maker as the one "of losing my business, my home, and
everything I've worked for."" 9
While options market makers occasionally benefit from insider
trading when they are able to detect it in advance and eventually trade in
Examination of the Impact of Market Microstructure Changes on the Determinants of
Option Bid-Ask Spreads, 12 INT'L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 563 (2003) (evidence from the
Australian Options Market); Jean-Michel Sahut, Option Market Microstructure, in RISK
MANAGEMENT AND VALUE: VALUATION AND ASSET PRICING 581 (Mondher Bellalah et
al. eds., 2008) (evidence from the Paris Options Market).
115. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 149-62, 172-74.
116. Some anecdotal stories suggesting harm imposed on specialized intermediaries
in options markets by insider trading are over a century old. See HIGGINS, supra note
57, at 55-57.
117. Colarusso, supra note 49. See also Bevis Longstreth, Op-Ed., Halting Insider
Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1984, at A27 (pointing out that "specialists who write
stock options have been bankrupted by honoring commitments to insiders").
118. Jeff Yass, The Mathematics of Strategy, in THE NEW MARKET WIZARDS:
CONVERSATIONS WITH AMERICA'S TOP TRADERS 396, 405 (Jack D. Schwager ed., 1992)
[hereinafter NEW MARKET WIZARDS].
119. Colarusso, supra note 49.
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the same direction before the relevant information is absorbed by the
market, they are much more likely to be harmed by this practice. 121
Options market makers are also subject to certain obligations that limit
their discretion to refuse dealing with other traders. 121 Another factor is
that insiders are likely to split their trades into multiple orders and across
different options exchanges,122 thereby making it more difficult for
options market makers to identify such trades. Furthermore, because
options market makers often engage in dynamic hedging, they risk
trailing behind the market when insiders try to profit on sudden price
jumps: "In a takeover situation... you might think that you are hedged,
but the price move occurs so quickly that you really aren't.'1
23
One industry professional even described the problem of insider
trading as a pivotal factor in the market-making business: "Taking
advantage of unforeseen, news-related stock moves, dividend changes or
some other form of insider information, these orders almost always
represent the most pre-hedge risk from the perspective of a [market
maker]. Insider orders are the primary reason why the public quote does
not always represent the best market."'124 In fact, the aggregate cost of
insider trading to options market makers seems to be substantial:
"Market makers PEAK6 LLC and AGS Specialists LLC say insider
trading is costing them at least 10% of annual earnings."' 125 Not
surprisingly, options market makers try to respond to perceived insider
trading: "[W]hen the true insider activity is present, the market-makers
120. "B" Interview, supra note 69.
121. See, e.g., SEC v. Pinez, 389 F. Supp. 325, 330 n.7 (D. Mass. 1997) ("Under
CBOE rules, the market makers were required to satisfy certain customer demands for
options, even if doing so meant trading options for their own accounts. The CBOE
market makers are, thus, the primary victims of alleged insider trading.").
122. Shearer, supra note 3, at 69.
123. Blair Hull, Getting the Edge, in NEW MARKET WIZARDS, supra note 118, at
363, 378. See also Cao et al., supra note 82, at 1074 (presenting empirical evidence that
"[p]reannouncement call option volume imbalance (e.g., buyer-seller initiated call
volume scaled by total volume) is highly predictive of the pending takeover)"); Yass,
supra note 118, at 406 (describing an instance involving insider trading in connection
with a takeover in which "the stock stopped trading before we had a chance to buy it as
a hedge against our position").
124. Letter from Mark Liu, Head Options Specialist, AGS Specialist Partners, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 15, 2004), http://www.sec.gov
/rules/concept/s70704/mliu8271 .htm.
125. Edgar Ortega & David Scheer, Goldman, Interactive Undermined by Insider
Trading on Options, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 2, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aB3t.CViRA3I.
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react to the aggressive nature of call buying [by hedging with the
underlying security or other options]."' 26  One academic study also
pointed out that certain institutional features of the CBOE aim to
"reduce the degree of anonymity on the CBOE and allow option market
makers to screen informed traders effectively."1
2 7
The CBOE's official position-expressed in a letter supporting the
SEC's proposal to ban selective disclosure by companies to investors
and financial analysts-also stressed the significance of losses of
options market makers: "[M]arket makers on the trading floor are
obliged to honor their markets and trade with . . . 'knowledgeable'
orders, which can cause these market makers substantial losses, and as a
result, also cause potentially, wider and less liquid options markets." 2 8
In general, options market makers believe that "[t]he costs [of insider
trading] aren't limited to their own losses, but include a possible decline
in the liquidity and thus the efficiency of options markets as a whole as
they respond to the losses by scaling back their activities." 1
29
Industry professionals confirm the academic argument on the link
between insider trading and bid-ask spreads. As one options market
maker observed, "[e]very trade we do involves some risk premium for
the possibility that the other side of the transaction represents informed
activity. . . . In essence, it's really the average investor who ends up
paying for insider trading through the wider bid/ask spreads."' 3 °  In
126. MCMILLAN, supra note 57, at 745. Furthermore, insider trading typically
"occurs in the near-term option series, particularly the at-the-money strike and perhaps
the next strike out-of-money [and impacts] other option series as market-makers (who
by the nature of their job function are short the near-term options that those with insider
trading are buying) snap up everything on the books that they can find." Id.
127. Lee & Yi, supra note 82, at 488. See also Cox & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 57, at
80-81 ("By [a CBOE] rule, Floor Brokers are obliged to 'give up' to the other party to a
transaction the name of the member firm initiating the order. From perhaps bitter past
experience, Market Makers learn to identify likely information traders and protect
themselves by giving more conservative quotes in response.").
128. Letter from Charles J. Henry, President and Chief Operating Officer, Chicago
Bd. Options Exch., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n 2 (May 9,
2000) (on file with author).
129. McGee, supra note 40.
130. Yass, supra note 118, at 406. Other commentators similarly noted that
"[m]arket makers also adjust buy and sell prices to compensate for potential losses after
realizing they have entered a suspicious trade." Ortega & Scheer, supra note 125.
Interestingly enough, an empirical study that looked at options trading around
merger/takeover announcements found that options bid-ask spreads tend to decline
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other words, insider trading translates into a systemic cost borne by the
options industry, with corresponding implications for the efficiency of
options markets and a possible spillover to equity markets. 131
The magnitude of the cost imposed by insider trading also explains
why industry professionals demand more enforcement and cite the
connection between regulation and market liquidity: "It is definitely
harmful to the quality of markets that we see in options, if insider
trading becomes more frequent. Our customers want to see that
liquidity, so we would want the regulators to be aggressive to protect
market makers from getting taken advantage of in any situation that gets
leaked out."132 In the eyes of options market makers, it logically follows
that, "[t]he more successful the SEC is in catching people trading on
inside information. .. the tighter the bid/ask spreads will be."13
3
The existence of substantial losses of options market makers from
insider trading is also suggested by cases, such as direct lawsuits or
distributions of disgorged profits by the SEC, that involve major price-
moving transactions, such as mergers, acquisitions, and takeover bids, in
which such losses are alleged. 134 These cases underscore the special role
during the preannouncement period, despite the evidence of informed trading, although
this counterintuitive result may be explained by an increased trading volume, which
should lower the fixed cost component of spreads, or the minimum tick size. Cao et al.,
supra note 82, at 1082.
131. For a discussion of the interaction of options and equity markets, see supra note
19.
132. Ortega & Scheer, supra note 125 (quoting Peter Bottini, Executive Vice
President OptionsXPress Holdings, Inc.).
133. Yass, supra note 118, at 406.
134. See SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1991) (trading on the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange in connection with upcoming announcements of tender offers, mergers,
and other important transactions); Lechman v. Ashkenazy Enters., Inc., 712 F.2d 327
(7th Cir. 1983) (trading on the CBOE in connection with an upcoming acquisition
announcement); SEC v. Euro Sec. Fund, 98 CLV. 7347 (DLC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34133 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2006) (trading on the Pacific Stock Exchange in connection
with an upcoming acquisition announcement); Prime Mkts. Group v. Masters Capital
Mgmt., No. 01 C 6840, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7928 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2003) (trading on
the CBOE in connection with an upcoming merger announcement); In re Motel 6 Sec.
Litig., 161 F. Supp. 2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); Abrams v. Prudential Sec., Inc.,
No. 99 C 3884, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18541 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2000) (same);
Goldsmith v. Pinez, 84 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Mass. 2000) (same); TFM Inv. Group v.
Bauer, No. 99-840, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15821 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1999) (trading on
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in connection with an upcoming merger
announcement); Rosenbaum & Co. v. H.J. Myers & Co., No. 97-824, 1997 U.S. Dist.
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of insider trading in options markets and the corresponding concerns of
options market makers because there is virtually no case law demon-
strating losses from insider trading to equity market makers.135
The position of the options industry and the existence of relevant
lawsuits strongly suggest that losses of options market makers from
insider trading are a common phenomenon, while no similar evidence
exists for market makers in other types of financial instruments. This
evidence also demonstrates the relevance of the characteristics of
options as complex securities, the structural features of options markets,
and the process of providing liquidity in options. Not every practice of
options market makers, however, which is attributed to their infor-
mational disadvantages in academic literature, such as payment for order
flow, serves as reliable evidence of this harm. 
13 6
LEXIS 15720 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997) (trading on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in
connection with an upcoming acquisition announcement); SEC v. Certain Unknown
Purchasers, No. 81 Civ. 6553, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15226 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1983)
(trading on the Pacific Stock Exchange in connection with an upcoming acquisition
announcement); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 1995)
(mentioning that trading in options in connection with an upcoming acquisition
announcement harmed an options market maker in an unnamed market).
135. Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 108-09. The only case involving an equity market
maker known to the author that fits the hypothetical, although imprecisely, is Amswiss
International Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 663 (N.D. Ga. 1975), in which a "third
market" market maker/broker-dealer sold shares to persons with the knowledge of the
impending merger. Id. at 665. On the other hand, the market maker claimed to have
relied on face-to-face affirmative misrepresentations, id., and the negotiated character of
these transactions and the lack of automatic double-sided executions of incoming orders
blurred the line between a market maker and a mere active trader occasionally dealing
with an undisclosed insider. In another case that bears some similarity, DuPont Glore
Forgan, Inc. v. Arnold Bernhard & Co., No. 73 Civ. 3071 (HFW), 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20385 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1978), an over-the-counter equity market
maker/broker-dealer alleged harm from insider trading in connection with a negotiated
purchase of a large block of stock before an earnings announcement was reported by the
Dow Jones News Service and certain newspapers, id. at **6-8. However, the court
ruled that the information about decreased earnings was public because this
announcement had appeared in the Reuters Financial Report before the transaction in
question. Id. at **13-21.
136. "Payment for order flow" refers to the practice of both equity and options
market makers of paying brokers for diverted orders that typically come from retail
investors, and this practice has been sometimes rationalized on the grounds that non-
retail, as opposed to retail, traders tend to be more informed than market makers. For a
presentation of this explanation and its critique, see Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 134-
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III. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON LOSSES OF
OPTIONS TRADERS FROM INSIDER TRADING AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR OPTIONS MARKET MAKERS
This Section reviews and critiques the existing judicial decisions
with respect to calculations of losses of options traders from insider
trading and develops several elements of a methodology for calculating
losses of options market makers. Part A asserts that such calculations
should depend on whether an options market maker has transacted with
insiders by using options from his inventory written by third parties or
by writing options himself. Part B argues for a scrutiny of losses stem-
ming from trading on inside information in the underlying security based
on the impact of such trading on the underlying security's price and the
overall position of an options market maker. Part C contends that such
calculations should account for the options market makers' hedging of
their risks with underlying securities or related derivatives.
A. Losses and the Distinction Between Inventory and Written Options
Several courts have distinguished transactions involving options
written by third parties and options written by an options trader
38. However, non-retail traders are not necessarily more informed than market makers,
and, similarly, retail traders do not necessarily lack information unknown to market
makers, and industry professionals interviewed by the author also denied the validity of
this explanation. "A" Interview, supra note 47; "B" Interview, supra note 69; Interview
with a former CBOE options market maker "C" in Chicago, Ill. (May 27, 2009)
[hereinafter "C" Interview]. One of the major reasons behind the existence of payment
for order flow is that a typical retail trader is at an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis
a market maker. As noted by an options market maker, "retail customers are looking at
delayed quotes, which are a snapshot of where the market was 20 minutes ago. Even
with live quotes, it's still a slow-motion scenario .... Trading against someone who
has a different timeframe from you can be profitable and is how payment for order flow
came into being." JON NAARIAN, How I TRADE OPTIONS 185-86 (2001). As another
industry similarly remarked, for options market markets, retail orders often represent
"dumb money." Interview with a former CBOE options market maker "D" in Chicago,
Ill. (Aug. 25, 2009) [hereinafter "D" Interview]. Of course, the practice of payment for
order flow is also attributed to other factors, such as relatively high bid-ask spreads or
profit margins present in the market in question, and this practice may also involve
conflicts of interest. "C" Interview, supra. Furthermore, retail order flow is attractive to
options market makers because it tends to consist of relatively small-and diverse-
orders that, to some degree, offset each other, and these characteristics of retail trades
make inventory management easier. "C" Interview, supra; "D" Interview, supra.
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himself.137 The Second Circuit articulated this distinction when it ruled
that "recovery [should not be] afforded to an options trader who sells [an
insider] options already in his inventory."'' 38 Even here, the court was
not entirely correct because it is possible for an options market maker to
suffer some loss by transacting in inventory options with a better-
informed insider, if there is no time to rebalance his inventory before the
relevant information is absorbed by the market. 39 This situation can
occur if that options market maker sells an option from his inventory to
an insider and then replenishes his inventory by purchasing the same
option at a higher price, or, in a less likely scenario, if he buys an option
from an insider and sells it later at a lower price or is unable to sell it
before the expiration date. 40 One district court possibly used this
reasoning when it attributed options market makers' losses to "the
significant re-purchase of the options a day later at a significantly higher
price," 14' although it is unclear whether the court was referring to
inventory or written options. Yet, overall, the Second Circuit was correct
in suggesting a pivotal difference between inventory options and written
options from the perspective of risk exposure.
B. Losses Stemming from Insider Trading in the Underlying Security
Another factor in calculating losses of an options trader is the
scrutiny of the impact of insider trading in the underlying security,
137. This distinction was recognized by commentators a long time ago: "Option
dealers . . . may 'write' and sell their own options or simply deal in the options of
others." S.A. NELSON, THE A B C OF OPTIONS AND ARBITRAGE 23 (1904).
138. SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1991).
139. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 110-11. Of course, this loss could be difficult
to measure, or, maybe, it could be mitigated because of inventory management before
the absorption of such information by the market. On the other hand, the illiquidity of
options markets is likely to interfere with inventory management.
140. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, § 3:3.3 (arguing that "[a market
maker's] damage is determined by comparing his or her actual inventory at the time of
disclosure with what that inventory would have been in the absence of the insider
trade"); Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread,
38 J. FiN. 1457, 1459 (1983) (presenting a theoretical model that demonstrates a loss to
a market maker when he trades with an insider from his inventory immediately before
inside information becomes public).
141. Rosenbaum & Co. v. H.J. Myers & Co., No. 97-824, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15720, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997).
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although the existing case law still exhibits substantial disparities among
jurisdictions with respect to the standing and loss causation issues.
Several early cases gave standing to options traders. 142 Another early
case addressed the issue of causation: "[A] purchaser of stock is injured
by insider trading in that stock. An options trader is likewise injured by
insider trading in the underlying shares since the price of the option is
directly related to the price of the stock."143 The Third Circuit crafted a
more refined approach to causation in its dictum, stating that "[i]nsiders
trading on undisclosed material information can injure option holders..
• by [creating] market activity which causes the price of the underlying
stock to move."' 144 This reasoning implies that insider trading in equity
markets might be a causal factor of price fluctuations and, corre-
spondingly, a determinant of options' payoffs and exercise decisions.
But the Eighth Circuit declined to recognize the existence of an injury to
options traders from insider trading in the underlying security by
asserting that "[t]he sine qua non in every private action under section
10(b) is unauthorized trading of securities in the same market."' 145
Furthermore, the court attacked the causal link: "There is only a
speculative relationship between the insider's trading and the alleged
loss caused to the options holder.... [T]he insider's trading of stock on
the stock market has no transactional nexus with the option holder's loss
on the options exchange." 1
46
142. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667 (D. Mass. 1982); In re
McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 488, 1982 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15481
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 1982). At the same time, one of the decisions pointed out that the
options trader in question "may have difficulty in establishing that he was damaged [by
such insider trading in shares]." Backman, 540 F. Supp. at 671.
143. Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 635 (E.D. Pa. 1989). A somewhat similar
decision, which argued for the existence of an injury in the context of two interrelated
markets, concluded that "[i]nsider trading of stock can distort not only the market for
stock but also the market for convertible debentures." In re Worlds of Wonder Sec.
Litig., No. C 87 5491 SC, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18396, at **11-12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
1990). However, the opinion also emphasized the convertibility feature of such
debentures and the existence of a fiduciary duty owed to holders of these securities by
insiders. Id. at **8-15. The later judicial decisions pertaining to this controversy,
without reconsidering the standing and causation issues, concluded that there had been
no insider trading. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 859 (N.D.
Cal. 1993), modified, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
144. Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 504 (3d Cir. 1988). The
plaintiffs in Deutschman did not raise an insider trading claim. Id. at 503.
145. Laventhal v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1983).
146. Id. For an extensive critique of Laventhal, see Deborah I. Mitchell, Note,
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Considering the merits of these two positions, the Third Circuit's
dictum, which points to a possible loss from the price effect of insider
trading in the underlying security, does have some force, despite the
problem of measuring this loss,147 although the concept of causation is
complex. 148 While its magnitude is uncertain, the price effect of insider
trading certainly does exist. In fact, several empirical studies present
evidence that informed trading, which includes insider trading, pushes
the market price of the security in question closer to its future post-
disclosure price,149 supporting much earlier theoretical claims.5 0 On the
Laventhal v. General Dynamics Corporation: No Recovery for the Plaintiff-Option
Holder in a Case of Insider Trading Under Rule lOb-5, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 780 (1984).
147. There is one important analogy in the context of the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, which
expressly gave the private right of action to persons who trade "contemporaneously"-
and in the opposite direction than insiders-in "securities of the same class." Id. § 5, at
4680-81. The legislative history of this statute also suggested the existence of the
private right of action available to non-contemporaneous traders if insider trading has a
damaging price effect-for instance, by making a publicly traded company's
acquisition more expensive. See H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 27-28 (1988). For a further
discussion of this congressional report and the relevant case law, see RALPH C.
FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 3.01 & nn. 10-12 (2d
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008).
148. One potential complication with causation is the analytical distinction between
(a) the impact of insider trading on the market price and "induced" marginal
transactions, i.e., comparing a universe where the insider has traded without disclosing
his information to a universe where the insider has neither traded nor disclosed, and (b)
the impact of nondisclosure as such, i.e., comparing a universe where the insider has
traded without disclosing his information to a universe where the insider has disclosed
his information and then traded. See generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, § 3:2
to :4.
149. See Ji-Chai Lin & Michael S. Rozeff, The Speed of Adjustment of Prices to
Private Information: Empirical Tests, 18 J. FIN. RES. 143, 144 (1995) (arguing that over
80% of the impact of private information is impounded in the market price on the same
trading day); Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J.
FIN. 1661, 1663 (1992) (stating that "insider trading is associated with immediate price
movements and quick price discovery"); but see Sugato Chakravarty & John J.
McConnell, Does Insider Trading Really Move Stock Prices?, 34 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 191, 208 (1999) (arguing that insider trading does not lead
"to more rapid price discovery than do trades by any other investor").
150. See MANNE, supra note 10, at 60-61 ("As those with valuable information
purchase shares, ipso facto, they tend to make the price or value of all shares rise
[creating the possibility that subsequent] disclosure will add nothing to the market price
..... ); FRANK P. SMITH, MANAGEMENT TRADING: STOCK-MARKET PRICE AND PROFITS
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other hand, depending on the overall composition of an options market
maker's portfolio, a more accurate price of the underlying security could
either harm or benefit this market participant by impacting options'
payoffs and exercise decisions. 51 Another factor is the impact of insider
trading on subsequently traded or written options. If insider trading
improves price accuracy before the relevant information is disclosed to
the market, it will cause such options to be traded or written at more
accurate prices, which could either decrease or increase the unfavorable
effect of the relevant information's disclosure on an options market
maker's overall position. More generally, the overall impact of price
fluctuations as such is ambiguous: "Normally, [when] a market maker's
entire portfolio of options on a given asset is aggregated .
considerable netting out of market exposure may occur."152
The link between insider trading in the underlying security and
losses of options market makers is possible despite the fact that such
transactions do not, by themselves, create order imbalances in the
relevant options market that adversely impact these market participants.
Yet, in practice, such calculations are likely to be very complex, such
losses might be hedged, and the overall impact of such price fluctuations
may even produce a marginal benefit. These losses will materialize only
in limited circumstances in which the price impact is clearly traced to
specific transactions in the underlying security by insiders and produces
an adverse impact on an options market maker's entire portfolio.
C. Hedging Losses with the Underlying Security and Other Derivatives
Another important issue for calculating options traders' losses from
insider trading is the significance of hedging techniques. While no
options market maker can be completely insulated from the impact of
insider trading at all times because of limitations of both static and
5 (1941) ("[With insider trading,] at the time the information is made public the market
price of the securities concerned will already be near the price which will prevail after
the announcement.").
151. As a simple illustration, the facts of Laventhal indicate that the plaintiff, who
purchased call options, could have benefited from the subsequent purchases of stock by
the defendant corporation in the open market, as such purchases exerted a marginal
upward pressure on the stock price, and, in any instance, once the information had been
released to the market, the stock price was still below the strike price of the plaintiff's
options. See Laventhal v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 408-10 (8th Cir. 1983).
152. Stephen Figlewski, Options Arbitrage in Imperfect Markets, 44 J. FIN. 1289,
1307 (1989).
2010 RISKS AND HEDGES OF PROVIDING 427
LIQUIDITY IN COMPLEX SECURITIES
dynamic hedging, the mitigating effect of these trading strategies should
be taken into account. For instance, combining a short call with a long
position in the equivalent number of shares essentially determines the
payoff when the option is exercised after the relevant information has
been revealed to the market, mitigating the loss from trading with an
insider possessing superior information.'53 Likewise, this risk can be
hedged with other options or futures on the underlying security.
Several federal courts were sympathetic to the idea of offsetting
damages on the basis of options traders' positions in the underlying
security or related options. For instance, one court approved a disgorge-
ment distribution plan based on "offsetting the contemporaneous seller's
gross loss from the sale of option contracts against his profits from
buying common stock or other series of call option contracts based on
that common stock." 154  Similarly, another court approved a
disgorgement distribution plan recognizing that "losses from sales of a
particular option series [may be mitigated] by contemporaneously
establishing related positions in other options of the same issuer." '55
This decision also pointed out the difference between writing options
"covered" by the underlying security in one's portfolio and
"uncovered"--or "naked"--options and concluded that "options traders
that wrote uncovered call options, that is, options on stock not in
inventory, assumed great risk of loss if the underlying stock price rose,
particularly those obliged to do so by virtue of requirements applicable
to market makers."' 5 6 Furthermore, the court emphasized that "there
simply were no comparable losses (or risks of loss) suffered by market
makers in stocks."' 5 7 In a similar case, the same court observed that one
of the claimants of disgorged profits who had traded options
"successfully employed hedging strategies to limit his exposure to loss
[from insider trading]." 58
153. The fact that options writers are hedged from insider trading losses, if they hold
a sufficient number of shares, was pointed out in the context of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), by Henry G. Manne. MANNE, supra note 10, at 90-91.
154. SEC v. Finacor Anstald, No. 90 Civ. 7667 (JMC), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12034, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1991).
155. SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1991).
156. Id. at 86.
157. Id.
158. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, 817 F.2d 1018, 1021 (2d Cir. 1987).
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The courts have recognized that focusing on isolated transactions
and ignoring hedging techniques would overcompensate options traders.
Yet, for an options market maker, calculations pertaining to this
mitigating factor are likely to be complex, depending on the ultimate
price impact of the piece of inside information in question, his overall
position, and limitations of static or dynamic hedging. For instance, in
one insider trading case, the plaintiff options market makers contested
the defendant's assertion that they "intended to maintain a true 'delta
neutral' position."159
IV. UNIQUENESS OF OPTIONS MARKET MAKERS' RISKS AND HEDGES IN
THE CONTEXT OF FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
This Section explores the boundaries of the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine and asserts that this context, also stemming from informational
asymmetry, further illustrates the uniqueness of risks and hedges of
options market makers. Part A briefly reviews the current boundaries of
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine and argues that it has special
implications for frequent traders and applies to options markets. Part B
considers the nature and evidence of losses of options market makers
from fraud-on-the-market and maintains that risks and hedges of these
market participants are unique.
A. Current Boundaries of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine and Its
Application to Frequent Traders and Options Markets
The essence of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine 160  can be
summarized by the following excerpt from the seminal decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court: "[I]n an open and developed securities market, the
price of a company's stock is determined by the available material
information .... The causal connection between the defendants' fraud
159. In re Motel 6 Sec. Litig., 161 F. Supp. 2d 227, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
160. For a sample of the voluminous academic commentary on the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine, see Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing
with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435
(1984); Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 455 (2006); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds,
Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance
from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990).
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and the plaintiffs' [losses] in such a case is no less significant than in a
case of direct reliance on misrepresentation[].,, 161 The federal judiciary
crafted the fraud-on-the-market doctrine as a means for plaintiffs to
prove their losses from affirmative misrepresentations and, in some
instances, omissions 16 2-mostly in the context of lawsuits against
corporations and their officers-without demonstrating specific reliance
but instead presuming "the integrity of the market price." '163 This
doctrine does not make any strong assumptions about the ultimate price
accuracy: "[T]he fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance does not
depend on the accuracy of the market price [but rather] on whether the
market price of the stock reflects all available information.
''64
The fraud-on-the-market doctrine has been heavily influenced by
the efficient capital markets hypothesis maintaining that all "available"
information about a security is reflected in its market price.165 The
Supreme Court itself limited the application of the doctrine to "well-
161. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser,
806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)). The intuition behind this statement was
considered much earlier by courts and commentators: "[It is not] necessary that the
purchaser knows of the specific false statement .... [W]here the effect of the statement
was to create a false valuation or appraisal by the entire market, and the buyer relied on
the state of the market, he had, at second hand as it were, relied on the statement itself."
A.A. Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 269
(1931) (discussing Bedford v. Bagshaw, (1859) 4 H. & N. 537, 157 Eng. Rep. 951
(Exch.)).
162. See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc, 814 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he 'fraud
on the market' theory ... has been employed by a number of courts in nondisclosure
cases . . .[but] there must be a duty to disclose before there can be liability."); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 859 (N.D. Cal. 1993) ("In a fraud on
the market case, 'silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading."') (quoting Basic,
485 U.S. at 239 n.17); see also 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, § 7:469
(analyzing the extension of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to certain types of
nondisclosure); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, § 4:7.3, at 4-210 to 4-211 & nn.633-
34 (same).
163. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
164. In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 510 (1st Cir. 2005).
165. For a classic introduction to the efficient capital markets hypothesis, see
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). This analytical concept is defined as follows: "A market in
which prices always 'fully reflect' available information is called 'efficient."' Id. at 383.
Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that "[r]ecent empirical studies have tended to confirm
• .. that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all
publicly available information." Basic, 485 U.S. at 246.
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developed, efficient, and information-hungry market[s]."' 166 The most-
widely used list of factors that indicate the existence of an "efficient"
market is as follows: a substantial trading volume in the security, the
coverage of the company by securities analysts, the existence of market
makers and arbitrageurs in the security, the company's eligibility to file
certain forms with the SEC, and a documented history of immediate
price movements in response to unexpected corporate news.1
6 7
Several courts have also pointed to other factors, such as the market
capitalization, the bid-ask spread, the percentage of securities held by
non-insiders, the easiness of short-selling, violations of the put-call
parity, and serial correlation.168 Overall, the efficiency determination is
more complex than a mechanical count of various factors. 1
69
Another important limitation of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo is the necessity of demonstrating clear realized losses rather than
analyzing losses as of the time of the initial transaction. 70  The Ninth
166. Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.29.
167. Cammerv. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285-87 (D.N.J. 1989).
168. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 273-78 (D. Mass.
2006); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001). See also Brad M.
Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common Stocks'
Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285 (1994) (offering an empirical analysis that compares the
predictive power of various proxies-including proxies used by the courts-for market
efficiency); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient: The Variability of
Federal Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in Cammer v. Bloom and Its Progeny,
10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 303 (2002) (examining the federal judiciary's decisions on
market efficiency proxies).
169. See Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (listing the
factors used in Cammer and Krogman and arguing that such factors "must be weighed
analytically, not merely counted, as each of them represents a distinct facet of market
efficiency"). The Cammer court, however, placed a special emphasis on one of the
factors, stating that "a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate
events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price . . . is the
essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on the market theory."
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287. Another court similarly stated that the responsiveness
of the stock price to the release of company-specific information is "in many ways, the
most important ... factor." In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d at 512.
170. In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 99CV0151-L (NLLS), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15258 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2000), rev'd sub nom. Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). For a further
analysis of Dura, see Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for
Rule lOb-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 63 Bus. LAW. 163 (2007); Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the
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Circuit held that "plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown
that the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of the
misrepresentation. '  The Supreme Court rejected this position and
offered a powerful rebuttal:
[A]t the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered
no loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a
share that at that instant possesses equivalent value. . . . [If] the
purchaser sells the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to
leak out, the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss. 172
Thus, the Dura decision has great significance for analyzing losses
of frequent traders, such as market makers. While such traders are more
likely to make a trade at a distorted price, the frequency of transactions
may mitigate their losses. 173
Another salient feature of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is its
application to options markets. The weight of the existing case law indi-
cates that options traders do have standing to be compensated for
damages from affirmative misrepresentations and certain omissions.
74
Supreme Court, and Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Bus. 1 (2005); Ann Morales Olazdbal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases
Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 337 (2006); James C. Spindler, Why
Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J.
653 (2007).
171. Dura, 544 U.S. at 340 (quoting Dura, 339 F.3d at 938). Also compare Merritt
B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 Bus. LAW. 507
(2005) (agreeing with this conclusion of the Ninth Circuit), with John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and
Reverse Broudo, 60 Bus. LAW. 533 (2005) (criticizing this conclusion of the Ninth
Circuit).
172. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
173. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4, at 178 (arguing that "[t]he fact that they trade
frequently is more likely to aid providers of liquidity than to harm them" in the context
of insider trading).
174. See Fry v. UAL Corp., 84 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 1996), aff'g 895 F. Supp. 1018
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (a dividend announcement allegedly made in bad faith); Deutschman v.
Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'g 668 F. Supp. 358 (D. Del. 1987)
(alleged affirmative misrepresentations about the financial condition of the company's
insurance subsidiary); In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(alleged affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to earning repurchase
reserves, residual interest valuations, internal controls, loan quality, and underwriting
standards); In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., Civil Action No: 05-2165 Section
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As one district court summarized the state of the law, "[i]n the context of
Section 10(b) allegations premised on fraudulent misrepresentations...
courts uniformly agree that option traders have standing." '175 The chief
arguments are that options, as "securities," are covered by the federal
securities laws'76 and that "[t]he duty not to make misrepresentations
R(3), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84869 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2008) (alleged affirmative
misrepresentations and omissions relating to the company's financial results and future
prospects); In re Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 247
F.R.D. 32 (D.D.C. 2008) (alleged affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating
to earnings manipulation and disclosure of financial statements not prepared in
accordance with GAAP); Levie v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (alleged duty to disclose merger negotiations); In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (alleged use of improper accounting
methods and affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to demand for the
company's products); In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 89 (D. Conn.
2006) (alleged affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to one of the
company's joint ventures and the nature of discounts offered through the company's
Web site); In re .Green Tree Fin. Corp. Options Litig., Civ. No. 97-2679 (JRT/RLE),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13986 (D. Minn. July 29, 2002) (alleged affirmative
misrepresentations and omissions relating to the company's financial condition); In re
Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 199 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (alleged
affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to the company's financial
condition and the problems with its computer system); Liebhard v. Square D Co., 811
F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (alleged affirmative misrepresentations about the status of
takeover negotiations); Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150 (C.D. Ill. 1991)
(alleged affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to the company's
finances and operations); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., 725 F. Supp.
712 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (alleged affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to
the proposed merger); Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (alleged
affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to the company's financial
condition); Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771 (D. Mass. 1988) (alleged
affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to the company's current and
projected operations and earnings and its ability to maintain growth levels); Kirby v.
Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303 (D. Mass. 1987) (alleged affirmative
misrepresentations about the company's growth and revenues); In re Digital Equip.
Corp. Sec. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 311 (D. Mass. 1984) (alleged affirmative
misrepresentations about the company's projected sales and earnings).
175. Green Tree, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13986, at *16. Levie v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 944, is an outlier case based solely on nondisclosure claims rather
than a combination of affirmative misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims.
176. Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 505; In re Arakis Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 99-
CV-3431 (ARR), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22246, at **1 1-12 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1999);
Digital, 601 F. Supp. at 314.
2010 RISKS AND HEDGES OF PRO VIDING 433
LIQUIDITY IN COMPLEX SECURITIES
does not depend on the existence of a fiduciary relationship." 17 Turning
to policy-based justifications, the courts have pointed out that the
protection of options traders is consistent with the federal securities
laws' goals of the honesty and integrity of securities markets; 1 8 that the
existence of options makes the market for the underlying security more
efficient in terms of better risk-sharing, greater liquidity, and lower
volatility; 179 and that recognizing options traders as proper plaintiffs
would not "open corporations up to limitless liability."'' 8' The courts
also expressly endorsed the idea that options traders rely on the integrity
of the market price, opening the door to the application of the fraud-on-
the-market doctrine. As one district court explained, "[j]ust as the trader
in the underlying stock relies on market integrity, so too does the options
trader. His market strategy may be different, but his reliance on market
integrity is the same.' 8' Another court pointed out that "the premium,
or price of the option contract is directly responsive to the market price
of the underlying security and to information affecting that price."'
182
177. Fry, 84 F.3d at 938.
178. Fry, 895 F. Supp. at 1035; In re Adobe Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 150,
154 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
179. Fry, 84 F.3d at 938; Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 507; Arakis, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22246, at *11; Moskowitz, 128 F.R.D. at 633; Tolan, 696 F. Supp. at 776.
180. Green Tree, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13986, at *20. See also Deutschman, 841
F.2d at 507 ("[P]rotection against unlimited liability [from claims of options traders] is
also afforded to the defendant by the proximate cause requirement .... "); Fry, 895 F.
Supp. at 1034 ("[T]here is no reason why the ability to control the magnitude of liability
should be a prerequisite for amenability to suit under Rule lob-5 [which] addresses not
mere negligence but knowing fraud . . . . The defendant can control the extent of
liability simply by refraining from engaging in the fraud." (quoting Sacksteder, supra
note 19, at 634 n.67)).
181. Tolan, 696 F. Supp. at 776. See also In re Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 247 F.R.D. 32, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2008) (sustaining the
presumption that an options trader relied on the integrity of the market price); Levie v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 944, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (same); In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 199 F.R.D. 119, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); Margolis v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150, 1156-57 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (same); Deutschman v.
Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 370 (D. Del. 1990) (same); Kirby v. Cullinet
Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 308 (D. Mass. 1987) (same). Another district court
provided the following explanation: "There is a fundamental difference between an
investor's [i.e., options holder's] presumption that the market price will move and the
fact that the price was tainted by fraud." Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 631 (E.D.
Pa. 1989).
182. Deutschman, 132 F.R.D. at 371.
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Even though the market for a given option might not be an efficient one
based on the efficiency of the underlying security alone, 183 it is likely
that organized markets in standardized options would be considered
efficient to satisfy this requirement of the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine. 184
B. Nature and Evidence of Losses of Options Market Makers from
Fraud-on-the-Market and the Uniqueness of Such Losses
Equity and options market makers are likely to be able to use the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine, although several courts have questioned
whether these market participants rely on the integrity of the market
price.'85 Affirmative misrepresentations or omissions by themselves do
183. In O'Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479 (W.D. Mich. 1995), the court criticized the
idea that "any fraud-on-the-market for the common stock [is] somehow transferred to
the market for the warrants [i.e., option-like instruments]" and rejected the "theory of
'derivative' fraud-on-the-market," id. at 506, pointing out that such warrants were sold
by the company to a limited number of investors at a fixed price, id. at 505-06. But see
In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
("[If an] options seller demonstrates market efficiency in the underlying security, he is
generally entitled to rely on the fraud on the market theory."); Weikel v. Tower
Semiconductor Ltd., 183 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.N.J. 1998) ("[T]o the extent the market for
[common stock] was efficient, the market for ... options may be viewed as efficiently
priced.").
184. Cf In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 266 (D. Mass.
2006) ("[While] a stock's listing on a national exchange does not, by itself, establish
that the stock trades in an efficient market ... [it] undisputably improves the market
structure for trading ... [and] one would be hard-pressed to deny the relevance of this
fact in an efficiency analysis."); 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, § 7:484
("[T]here should be a presumption... that certain markets [including the CBOE] are
developed and efficient for virtually all the securities traded there [which] would be
rebuttable on a showing that the specific security in question is inactively traded on the
market or unresponsive to new information.") (emphasis added).
185. For instance, in Susquehanna Investment Group v. Amgen Boulder, Inc., 918 F.
Supp. 326 (D. Colo. 1996), the court dismissed the theory that options market makers
"did not rely on the integrity of the market but rather engaged in conduct which was
essential to setting the prices in the market on which others would rely," id. at 328. The
court convincingly argued that "[t]he plain language of the Securities Acts does not
exclude market makers from their protection" and that the U.S. Supreme Court in its
Basic decision specifically mentioned market makers in its discussion of "causal
connection." Id. at 329. Also compare Tsirekidze v. Syntax-Brillian Corp., No. CV-07-
02204-PHX-FJM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61145, at ** 19-20 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2009)
(stating that equity market makers in the putative class relied on the integrity of the
market price), and In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., No. 98-8258-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS,
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not create marginal transactions, although some impact is possible, but
an options market maker would still trade and create options at
"incorrect" prices. A price distortion and its eventual correction may
damage an options market maker's position by impacting options'
payoffs and exercise decisions. Reported cases also point to the
existence of some losses of options market makers from fraud-on-the-
market. 18 6 Still, casual empiricism suggests that fraud-on-the-market is
a lesser concern for these market participants than insider trading, which
might be explained by the fact that the former does not, by itself, create
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25703, at **9-12 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001) (declining to exclude
equity market makers from the certified class as traders not relying on the integrity of
the market price), and In re Oxford Health Plans, 199 F.R.D. at 124 (sustaining the
presumption that options market makers relied on the integrity of the market price), and
Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 411-12 (D. Minn. 1998) (sustaining the
presumption that an options market maker relied on the integrity of the market price),
and Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (sustaining the
presumption that an equity market maker relied on the integrity of the market price),
and In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., No. 77 C 1206, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3673, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1987) (declining to rule out that an equity market maker
relied on the integrity of the market price), with Tice v. NovaStar Fin., Inc., Case No.
04-0330-CV-W-ODS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16800, at *24 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2004)
(concluding that an equity market maker, as a class representative, might be subject to
unique defenses, including the lack of reliance on the integrity of the market price), and
Queen Uno Ltd. P'ship v. Couer D'Alene Mines Corp., 183 F.R.D. 687, 691-92 (D.
Colo. 1998) (concluding that an market maker in both equity and options markets, as a
class representative, might be subject to unique defenses, including the lack of reliance
on the integrity of the market price), and McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D.
331, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (concluding that an equity market maker, as a class
representative, might be subject to unique defenses, including the lack of reliance on the
integrity of the market price).
186. See In re Oxford Health Plans, 199 F.R.D. 119 (two market makers in an
unnamed market claiming harm from alleged affirmative misrepresentations and
omissions relating to the financial condition of the company and the problems with its
computer system); Chill, 181 F.R.D. 398 (a CBOE options market maker claiming harm
from alleged affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to subsequently
restated reports employing unreasonably aggressive accounting methods); Queen Uno,
183 F.R.D. 687 (a CBOE options market maker, which also served as an equity market
maker in the over-the-counter market, claiming harm from alleged affirmative
misrepresentations and omissions relating to the company's operational losses and
profitability and condition and prospects of one of its mines); Susquehanna, 918 F.
Supp. 326 (a Philadelphia Stock Exchange options market maker claiming harm from
alleged affirmative misrepresentations and omissions relating to the efficacy of a new
pharmaceutical product).
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order imbalances that adversely impact options market makers.
Similarly, the impact of affirmative representations or certain
omissions, which obviously have a more direct and immediate effect on
the underlying security's price compared to the effect produced by
insider trading, on this market participant may be ambiguous, depending
on the magnitude and direction of this price impact and the composition
of his portfolio. Under a number of scenarios, such affirmative mis-
representations and omissions may even benefit an options market
marker, potentially making him a "big winner," '87 which requires a
scrutiny of his overall position to determine the existence of a loss.
Furthermore, the price impact of fraud-on-the-market and its subsequent
correction on the underlying security's volatility could either benefit or
harm an options market maker, depending on his volatility position, and
the impact on options' trading volume should be considered as well. 88
Likewise, hedging techniques of options market makers create another
offset in calculating such losses.
As suggested by Dura, frequent traders' losses might be mitigated
because of the turnover of their portfolios.189 Market makers are, of
course, frequent traders par excellence that might avoid substantial
losses,IO although options market makers-compared to their
counterparts in equity markets-could be at a greater disadvantage
because options markets are less liquid and hence present greater
187. "C" Interview, supra note 136.
188. "A" Interview, supra note 47; "B" Interview, supra note 69; "C" Interview,
supra note 136.
189. See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
190. See Edward A. Dyl, Estimating Economic Damages in Class Action Securities
Fraud Litigation, 12 J. FORENsIC ECON. 1, 8 (1999) (presenting a methodology for
calculating losses based on an actual lawsuit and arguing that, "[s]ince market makers
[on NASDAQ] generally are assumed to have resold their shares of stock on the same
day they purchased them-with both transactions occurring at the artificially high
prices prevailing during the Class Period-they [should not be] considered members of
the Class"); see also In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivatives Litig., Civil Action No: 05-
2165, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19210, at *23 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2009) (approving a
settlement in a fraud-on-the-market case involving affirmative misrepresentations and
omissions relating to the company's financial results and future prospects that denied
any compensation "for put options sold during the Class Period to offset a long position
in the same option that was purchased at any time prior to the sale"); Etshokin v.
Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1220, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (observing that, in the context
of allegations of direct reliance on affirmative misrepresentations and omissions, an
options market maker was "in the unique position of being both a purchaser and seller
of... call options during the relevant trading period").
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difficulties for inventory management. On the other hand, a potential
upside from fraud-on-the-market might be greater for options market
makers-for instance, because of the volatility factor, and some industry
professionals are of the opinion that, overall, the impact of fraud-on-the
market is more likely to benefit options market makers.' 9' More
generally, options market makers' realized losses stem from unfavorable
changes in their inventories when an option is exercised or when the true
information is absorbed by the market.
The application of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to options
market makers also illustrates their unique risks and hedges. Ana-
lytically, losses of these market participants from fraud-on-the-market
can be approached in the same fashion as losses from insider trading.
One would also expect the former to have a lesser adverse impact on
options market makers, which seems to be the case in practice.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the brunt of insider trading often falls
on options market makers in contrast to their counterparts in equity
markets. This phenomenon can be explained by the leveraged nature and
hence greater risks of options, the fact that options are frequently
"created" rather than merely "traded," potential problems with dynamic
and static hedging, and the relative illiquidity of options markets-partly
due to the existence of a spectrum of options on the same underlying
security-and corresponding difficulties of options market makers with
managing risk exposures. Insider trading is not an imaginary concern for
the options industry, and, in this instance, losses from insider trading are
concentrated rather than diffused among numerous market participants.
Existing evidence in fact demonstrates the gravity of losses of options
market makers, and the potential adverse impact in the form of more
costly transactions in options constitutes a proven economic cost of
insider trading. Of course, whether insider trading in options markets
affects the fragility of the financial marketplace and the liquidity of
equity markets to a degree that impedes capital formation, resulting in a
true social cost, is an empirical question-and a difficult one.
Furthermore, the federal courts need to make a more general
191. "B" Interview, supra note 69.
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"distinction between the market maker and the ordinary investor" 192-
something they have often neglected to do. The judiciary should
recognize these market participants' specific trading strategies,
obligations to deal with other traders, and hedging techniques in
calculations of options market makers' losses from insider trading and
fraud-on-the-market under the existing regime of civil liability,
navigating between the Scylla of under-compensation and the Charybdis
of over-compensation. Making this distinction would be in line with
continuing advances in the economics of liquidity provision in options
markets.19' In fact, despite the lack of a comprehensive methodology of
estimating losses from insider trading or fraud-on-the-market of options
market makers or even options traders more generally, several courts
have demonstrated an understanding of the underlying economics and
provided a framework for analyzing this issue.
192. Etshokin, 612 F. Supp. at 1232.
193. Even a prominent academic recently summarized the current state of
derivatives research by the statement that "we need more realistic models of market
structure-in particular, of the market makers." David Bates on Crash and Jumps, in
HAUG, supra note 61, at 335, 341.
